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ABSTRACT
The Rise of Populist Rhetoric and the Mainstreaming of a Party?
Testing the Rhetorical Shifts Between Front National’s Presidents Jean-Marie Le Pen and
Marine Le Pen
by
Muriel C. McGregor
Utah State University, 2019

Major Professor: Dr. Steffen Blings
Department: Political Science
In France, the far right-wing party, Le Front National, has experienced recent
growth in electoral success. Scholars of the Front National have in part attributed the
party’s success to its increased use of populist rhetoric, that is anti-elite sentiments, antipluralist sentiments, and appeals to people. This thesis delineated a definition of populist
rhetoric and examined its use between the Front National’s past president Jean-Marie Le
Pen (JMLP) and current president Marine Le Pen (MLP) in order to test these scholarly
claims. In particular, I tested three hypotheses: 1) the use of populist rhetoric by MLP
compared to JMLP has experienced either no change or an increase; 2) the use of
xenophobic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has experienced either no change or a
decrease; and 3) the use of economic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has
experienced no change or an increase. Using an inductive mixed methods approach, I
compiled a dictionary of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric. Then, using
transcriptions of the party leaders' campaign speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017
French presidential elections, I conducted a quantitative dictionary-based analysis on
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their use of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric. For added nuance and to
validate my quantitative results, I sampled a selection of the speeches to use for a
qualitative content-based analysis. My results showed that, contrary to scholarly claims,
there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between
JMLP and MLP. This was due to MLP’s 2012 campaign; however, my inclusion of
MLP’s 2017 exposed a return to levels of populist rhetoric use comparable to JMLP.
Overall, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist rhetoric in the Front National
has more to do with the saliency of populism than numerical fact.
(96 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
The Rise of Populist Rhetoric and the Mainstreaming of a Party?
Testing the Rhetorical Shifts Between Front National’s Presidents Jean-Marie Le Pen and
Marine Le Pen
Muriel C. McGregor

Populist movements have been on the rise across Europe and the Americas. In
France, the far right-wing party, Le Front National, has experienced recent growth in
electoral success. Scholars of the Front National have in part attributed the party’s
success to its increased use of populist rhetoric. This thesis examines the populist
rhetoric used between the Front National’s past president Jean-Marie Le Pen and current
president Marine Le Pen in order to test these scholarly claims. Based on their campaign
speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 French presidential elections, I conducted a
quantitative dictionary-based analysis on the difference in use of populist, xenophobic,
and economic rhetoric between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. My results show
that there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between
the two leaders. Consequently, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist
rhetoric in the Front National has more to do with the saliency of populism than
numerical fact.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 21, 2002 Jean-Marie Le Pen - the President of the far right-wing party
the Front National - won enough of the popular vote to boost him to the second round of
the French presidential election. Meanwhile, France’s establishment looked on aghast
that extreme rhetoric intimating a right to difference, the return of the death penalty, and
denial of the holocaust was apparently resonating with the French people.1 Fast-forward
to France’s most recent presidential campaign in 2017 where the new president of the
Front National - Marine Le Pen (daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen) - not only succeeded to
the second round of voting, but emerged as a real contender to win.2 Her platform of
economic protectionism, welfare chauvinism, combating illegal immigration, and
criticizing the European Union attracted voters from across the board.3
Part of the Front National’s rising success has been attributed to its use of
populist rhetoric (see Gundogar 2013; Mondon 2016; Reynié 2011; Stockemer 2014;
Wieviorka 2013; Williams 2011). Indeed, news sources and scholars alike have
increasingly associated the party with the right-wing populist movements sweeping
across Europe and the United States (Galston 2018; Mondon 2015; Wodak 2013,
2017). Marine Le Pen has accepted the party’s rising affiliation with populism, casually

“Le Pen vote shocks France.” The Guardian. 22 April 2002.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/thefarright.france.
2
“France's Le Pen turns far-right party into contender for power.” Reuters. 14 April 2017.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-lepen-newsmaker/frances-le-pen-turns-far-right-partyinto-contender-for-power-idUSKBN17G18J.
3
“Le programme de Marine Le Pen pour la présidentielle 2017.” L’Express. 11 April 2017.
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/programme-marine-le-pen-presidentielle2017_1896717.html.
1
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expressing that “Populiste? Le mot ne me gêne pas” [Populist? The word doesn’t bother
me].4
While the saliency of populism and its use among politicians has grown, the
question emerges if the National Front has actually increased its populist
rhetoric. Currently, no Front National scholar has systematically tested if this rhetorical
shift actually exists. Several, however, argue that the populist repositioning of the party
began under Jean-Marie Le Pen, prior to Marine Le Pen’s leadership (Mondon 2014;
Gundogar 2013) - henceforth abbreviated as JMLP and MLP respectively. In the 2007
presidential election these efforts were greatly aided when the right-wing republican
party candidate - Nicholas Sarkozy - explicitly coopted the FN’s stances on immigration
and law and order as well as their burgeoning populist strategy (Mondon 2014). Indeed,
this allowed for the National Front’s viewpoints to enter the political mainstream. As a
counter to this view, though, other scholars claim that the party’s gradual move towards
populism during the 2000’s was catalyzed by the rising National Front leaders - which
included MLP - not JMLP (Stockemer 2014).
In my thesis, I shed light on this debate by systematically measuring the populist
rhetoric as well as the xenophobic and economic rhetoric in JMLP’s and MLP’s
campaign speeches from the French 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 presidential
elections. The Front National offers a unique case in that it has only had two leaders
since its inception; this allows for more rhetorical consistency over time as well as for
easier isolation of any rhetorical shifts. Indeed, as seen with the FN, far-right parties are

Note, all French translations in this paper are my own. “Marine Le Pen « Populiste? Le mot ne me gêne
pas ».” VSD. 9 November 2011. http://vsd.fr/les-indiscrets/18681-marine-le-pen-populiste-le-mot-ne-megene-pas-4582.
4

3
often leader focused. Consequently, leaders, as the most visible part of a party,
communicate frames of reference – that is norms, values, and beliefs – with potential
voters, shaping their perception of reality (Druckman 2001). This is often done through
the vehicle of campaign speeches. While political speeches are often multi-authored, it is
the political speaker who owns their message and hence the impression they impart
(Charteris-Black 2011).
Through my research, I developed three dictionaries: one that measures populist
rhetoric, one for xenophobic rhetoric, and one for economic rhetoric. I utilized these
dictionaries to analyze JMLP’s and MLP’s campaign speeches; this formed the basis for
my quantitative results. My quantitative results give solid numbers on the use of
populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric between JMLP and MLP as well as
elucidate the scholarly debate as to the extent of the leader’s actual rhetorical
differences. Moreover, I created a descriptive coding scheme for the categorization of all
three types of rhetoric. I used this scheme to code a random selection of campaign
speeches from both JMLP and MLP. This formed the basis for my qualitative analysis.
My qualitative analysis not only validates my quantitative results and provides context,
but draws out the nuances of current scholarly claims. The ultimate dataset I obtained on
the populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric used by JMLP and MLP serves as the
foundation for future analysis on the perception of the Front National and the use of
populism. While the instruments I used and results I derived are specific to the FN, my
methods stand as a model for other researchers to follow in analyzing other far right-wing
populist parties and their leader’s rhetoric.
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In this thesis, I first define populism, followed by a discussion on far right-wing
populist rhetoric, inclusionary and exclusionary populism, xenophobic rhetoric, and
economic rhetoric. Next, I briefly describe the Front National’s origin and evolution
under JMLP. Then, I review the current literature concerning the rhetorical shift between
JMLP and MLP and propose three testable hypotheses. I subsequently outline the
methodology for my research and provide the results of my initial dictionary and coding
pilot tests. Next, I report the results of my quantitative and qualitative analyses. Lastly, I
test my data against my hypotheses and discuss the implications of my findings with
respect to the scholarly debate.

5
POPULISM: A DEFINITION
In order to form a basis for my dictionary on populist rhetoric, I first define
populism. According to the frequently referenced definition by Mudde, populism is “a
thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and
which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”
(2004, p. 23). This results in three foundational pillars of populism: 1) anti-elitism, 2)
anti-pluralism, and 3) appeals to the people. Moreover, populism frequently involves a
charismatic leader, although it is not a requirement (Muller 2017; Van der Burg &
Mughan 2007). For the purposes of my research, I focus on and define the three pillars
of populism. With respects to the claim that populism is an ideology, further discussion
is beyond the scope of this paper. Do note, however, scholars range on their
categorization of populism as a “thin-centered” ideology, a strategy, or a discursive style
(for ideology see Freeden 1996; Stanley 2008; for strategy see Canovan 1999; Giraudi
2018; Betz 2004; for discursive style see Moffit & Tormey 2014).
For the first pillar of populism, anti-elitism references a disdain for the power held
by the political class and administrative bureaucracy (Betz & Immerfall 1998). Indeed,
formal institutions and structures are seen as self-interested and unresponsive to public
policy preferences (Galston 2017). In turn, the second pillar of anti-pluralism grounds
itself on the belief that “the people” are homogeneous and that their culture needs to be
protected (Betz 2004; Galston 2017). This connects with the ethnopluralist perspective
which “considers different cultures to be equal, but distinct and thus incompatible” as
well as nativist tendencies which perceive outsiders as a threat to the native culture
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(Golder 2016, p. 480). As for the last pillar, appeals to the people, this encompasses the
idea that ordinary citizens house inherent “common sense” which lends them authority to
make governmental decisions, often via referendum (Ignazi 2003, Betz & Immerfall
1998, Mudde 2007). Moreover, such appeals include attempts by politicians to stir
people's anger, fears, and resentments (Betz 1994; Mondon 2014; Wodak 2015). Do note
that the literature defining appeals to the people is underdeveloped compared to the other
two pillars of populism. As a result, this pillar retains a degree of ambiguity to be filled
by future research.
For the purpose of my thesis, I chose to use Mudde’s definition for its concise
articulation on the widely agreed elements of populism, namely anti-elitist and antipluralist messages with the claim to be the voice of the silent majority. The concentration
on these features points to the heart of populism in action via rhetoric, rather than
digressing into a theoretical discussion of its structure. Moreover, both anti-elitism and
anti-pluralism speak to the connection between populism and democracy. That is when a
democratic system is not sufficiently responding to its citizens, a spoken critique of the
political administration is necessary in order to correct this disconnected representation
(Canovan 1999; Giraudi 2018). When people feel alienated - whether it be through
ethnic competition, relative deprivation, or isolation5 - this can lead to a demand for
change. Parties can utilize their given political opportunity structure to address these
concerns and increase electoral support (Eatwell & Mudde 2003; Rydgren 2007).
There are two main strains of populism: inclusive and exclusive. Inclusive and
exclusive populism can be broken down into three dimensions: material, political, and

5

For further discussion on why people support far right-wing parties (i.e. demand side theories) see: Betz
1994; Eatwell & Mudde 2003; Lucassen & Lubbers 2012; Kriesi et al 2006; and Rydgren 2007.
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symbolic (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013). Along these dimensions, inclusive populism
targets specific groups to receive more state benefits, increase political participation, and
be part of “the people”. Exclusive populism, on the other hand, aims to prevent specific
groups from receiving state benefits, often calling for a national preference system (also
known as welfare chauvinism) where natives get preference in receiving state benefits
(Rydgren 2004). Moreover, exclusive populism attempts to stymie these same groups
from engaging in the democratic process and from being considered part of “the people”.
The motivations beyond exclusionary populist policies often stem from ethnocentrism that is a preference for one's in-group, a sense of in-group superiority, and a desire to
preserve one’s in-group cohesion (Bizumic & Duckitt 2012). As a result, these policies
are often targeted at ethnic minorities and foreigners. Consequently, exclusive populism
falls within the populist pillar of anti-pluralism.
The two distinct strains stem from differing historical factors, ideological
foundations, and geographical locations; namely, Latin America with inclusive and
Europe with exclusive (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013). In Europe populist parties are
generally found exclusively on the far-right with ties to nativist and authoritarian
ideologies. Due to the association between Europe and exclusive populism, I focus on
exclusive populism in my research and exclude further discussion of inclusive populism.
However, a more expansive research project would merit a lengthened analysis of
inclusive populism.
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FAR RIGHT-WING POPULIST RHETORIC
While Mudde's definition establishes the three pillars of populism, my research
aims to hone in on populist rhetoric. Since scholars have traditionally categorized the
Front National as a far-right wing party, I delineate out far right-wing populist rhetoric in
particular. While the examination of scholarly debate surrounding what constitutes a far
right-wing party is beyond the scope of this paper, I base my use of the word on the idea
that a far right-wing party advocates for major societal changes – which veer from current
policy consensus – through participation in democratic political institutions (Eatwell
2000; Powell 1986).
On its own, rhetoric is the “practical science and art of effective or efficient
speaking and writing in public” (Abell et al. 2008). Rhetoric conjoined with populism
manifests as anti-elite and anti-pluralist sentiments with the claim that these opinions are
representative of the people. In particular, populist rhetoric distinguishes between the ingroup and the out-group(s) and creates a list of enemies. These enemies include the
political and economic elite as well as anything that threatens the in-group. With respects
to far right-wing populist parties, other enemies are frequently the progressive left, the
media, ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, Muslims and Jews, ex-patriots,
international organizations, and foreign countries (Mudde 2007, Chapter 3).
Another feature of populist rhetoric is its various appeals grounded in the antielite and anti-pluralist framework where people should be the basis of governmental
decisions. In far right-wing populism, these appeals manifest as an appeal to the common
sense of the people against intellectual knowledge, an appeal to feelings of being
exploited, an appeal to fears of disruption and insecurity, an appeal to the right to cultural
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difference, and an appeal to national preference (Betz & Johnson 2016). Moreover, these
appeals are often presented in black and white options and/or as part of a conspiracy
theory with specific moral stances and historical myths used to justify predetermined
conclusions (Wodak 2015).
Furthermore, far right-wing populist rhetoric is often used by a charismatic leader
(Muller 2017; Van der Brug & Mughan 2007). This translates into the leader using
everyday plain language as way to make their message clear and relatable. Indeed,
charismatic populist politicians attempts to represent themselves as part of the people
while at the same time claiming to be the solution. Overall this creates a “double
positioning as both the savior of the people and representing the people; and as being one
of the people” (Wodak 2015, p. 127). Savvy political leaders also use an element of
performance when delivering populist rhetoric; however, analysis of this dimension is
beyond the scope of this paper.

10
XENOPHOBIC & ECONOMIC RHETORIC
While my research’s main concern is in regards to measuring populist rhetoric
between JMLP and MLP, the creation of dictionaries for both xenophobic and economic
rhetoric provide additional insight into scholarly claims about the Front National. As a
result, I separate out each type of rhetoric into its own dictionary – that is populist,
xenophobic, and economic – and further delineate subcategories for each type of rhetoric
in order to achieve more granular measurement.
Xenophobia is a “fear of individuals who are different or ‘strange’” (Rydgren
2004, p. 158). Xenophobic rhetoric, then, encompasses negative references to other
ethnic identities (Pérez 2015), sometimes to the point of fear, hatred, and hostility (Watts
1996), with a belief that people have an inherent right to live separately from these other
ethnicities (Miles 1993). Overt xenophobic rhetoric can be couched in terms of
biological racism and ethnopluralist sentiments – that is the maintenance and/or
establishment of ethnically separated regions as well as the preservation of one’s culture
against homogenization (Betz 1994), called a right to difference or differentialism.
On the milder side, exclusionary populist rhetoric – which encompasses attempts
to prevent certain groups from receiving benefits or participating in the political process can be seen in calls against immigration, for ultra-security policies, and in favor of
national preference (Hainsworth 2004). While the line between overt xenophobic
rhetoric and exclusionary populist rhetoric is subjective, overt xenophobia is always a
subset of exclusionary populist rhetoric while exclusionary populist rhetoric is always a
subset of anti-pluralist rhetoric. For a diagram showing the relationship between anti-
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pluralism, exclusionary populism, and xenophobic rhetoric, see Figure 1, Nested AntiPluralism.

Figure 1: Nested Anti-Pluralism

In my analysis I separate out anti-pluralist, exclusionary populist, and overt
xenophobic rhetoric into three categories. I put words that are anti-pluralist only in a
category under the umbrella of populist rhetoric. Under xenophobic rhetoric, I put words
that reference exclusionary populism in their own category and words that represent overt
xenophobia in their own category. Also of note, while exclusionary populist and overt
xenophobia rhetoric are not limited to the far-right, far-right wing parties frequently
utilize them (for further discussion on the link between xenophobia and far right-wing
parties, see Betz 2003; Karapin 1998; and Kopeček 2007).
I define economic rhetoric in politics as including statements about the nation’s
growth, unemployment, wages, taxes, corporations, and trade. More precisely, however,
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a politician’s discussion of economics aims at appealing to voters by highlighting
responsible parties and how, in turn, they can offer congruency or change (Anderson
2000).
Paired with right-wing populism, economic rhetoric advocates anti-globalization,
protection of national businesses and native employment, and regulation of the financial
elite (Betz & Immerfall 1998; Mudde 2007). As a result, in my analysis, I separate out
economic rhetoric into two categories: general economics and right-wing populist
economics. Moreover, since right-wing populist economic rhetoric encompasses
regulation of the financial elite, it also overlaps with anti-elitism on this point.
Consequently, words that reference finance and banking fall under both categories. For
a diagram showing the relationship between anti-elitism and right-wing populist
economic rhetoric, see Figure 2, Venn Diagram Anti-Elitism & Right-Wing Populist
Economics.

Figure 2: Venn Diagram Anti-Elitism & Right-Wing Populist Economics
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Overall, the relationship between populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric is
complex. Scholars do not agree on definitions for each type of rhetoric, nor are they able
to set definite outlines of what each rhetorical category encompasses. For my thesis,
however, I have attempted to establish general boundaries for populist, xenophobic, and
economic rhetoric in order to have a basis for quantitative measurement as well as to
create a model for other researchers. To visualize the relationship between populist,
xenophobic, and economic rhetoric, along with their subcategories of appeals to the
people, anti-pluralism, anti-elite, exclusionary populism, overt xenophobia, far-right wing
populist economics, and the general economy, see Figure 3: Rhetoric Categories &
Hypotheses.6
Figure 3: Rhetoric Categories & Hypotheses

6

For a presentation and explanation of my hypotheses and how each rhetorical category relates to each
hypothesis, see my section “Rhetorical Shifts Between JMLP and MLP” pages 20-22.
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THE FRONT NATIONAL: BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION UNDER JMLP
As detailed in the work of Delwit (2012), the Front National embodied a desire
for radical right-wing politics to be seen as modern, forward-looking, and respectable.
Founded in 1972 through a unification of several French neofascist/nationalist parties and
with Jean-Marie Le Pen chosen to be its first president, the FN sought to democratically
overthrow what it saw as a decadent regime under Georges Pompidou and protect against
subversive communism.7
In the 1980s8, as a “conservative revolution” began to take hold in Europe and the
United States, the FN honed in on key issues like unemployment due to
deindustrialization, the problems associated with immigrants, and the need to increase the
French birth rate in order to maintain national identity. As the party found its footing in
the political arena, it specialized its message further to promote la préférence nationale
[national preference] and immigration policy reform. Moreover, during the 1988
presidential election, JMLP paid particular attention to his image as well as his platform,
landing him 4th place in the first round of voting and contributing to the FN’s success in
the legislative elections that year. Gradually, a pattern began to emerge for the Front
National’s voter base: male, young to middle aged, non-practicing Catholic or nonreligious, and blue-collar worker.9

7

Delwit organizes FN history into four stages. This beginning phase - la traversée du désert - spans from
1972-1983 as outlined in pages 11-18
8
Delwit titles this phase “L’enracinement et la consolidation du Front National”, which spans from 19831999, pages 18-29.
9
While the Fromt National was originally associated with the Catholic Church – due to support from
prominent Catholic conservatives, such as the archbishop Marcel Lefebvre –, the party’s link to Christian
values has more to do with France’s history as a Catholic nation, nationalist sentiments being linked to that
history, and the association of nationalism with the far-right. For further discussion on the development of
the FN voter base, called ouvriéro-lepensisme, see pages 24-25.
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However, the party received bad press throughout the early 1990s after JMLP
made several anti-Semitic and racist statements.10 The party became further stigmatized
when it declared opposition to the Maastricht Treaty – the impetus for the creation of the
EuroZone. The National Front feared that a merging of economies would destroy
France’s sovereignty, national identity, and overall patriotism. At the same time, the key
enemy of the party – the Soviet Union – collapsed. Another setback came when the
party’s délégue général [executive officer] Bruno Mégret split to create his own party in
1998 after JMLP refused to “normalize” the party’s rhetoric as well as to concede his
position as the party’s president.11
Despite voter polls showing that the Front National was viewed as “racist,
sectarian, and incapable of governing” (Shields 2007, p. 247), the party experienced a
resurgence in the mid-1990s. Unemployment was on the rise as were crime rates.
Moreover, a large number of immigrants were moving into France creating new social
tensions. In 1995, JMLP launched another presidential campaign. He ran on a platform
calling for job creation, national preference, repatriation of certain immigrants, phasing
out of income tax, and the reestablishment of the death penalty. In the subsequent
presidential election of 2002, JMLP unexpectedly made it to the second round of voting,
launching the party to greater visibility.12

In particular, JMLP’s mitigation of the Holocaust and Bruno Mégret’s “immigration policy” which called
for the repeal of anti-racist legislation, the expulsion of unemployed immigrants, and the ban on places of
worship foreign to French identity.
11
JMLP declared “The National Front was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, led by him for twenty-five years
[...] there isn’t any reason why this should stop.” Meanwhile, Bruno Mégret first introduced the strategy of
dédiabolisation - or dedemonization - for the party. The term was later rebirthed when MLP became party
president.
12
The next phase in FN history, l’essoufflement (constriction), encompasses 2000-2011. See Delwit 2012,
p. 29-36.
10
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Gradually, however, once loyal party voters drifted toward the center-right, in
particular in the 2007 presidential election of Nicolas Sarkozy. Moreover, voting laws
had changed in 2004 from a regional proportional representative system to majoritarian
one, drastically decreasing FN seats in key areas of support. A growing sense emerged
among party leadership that its image needed to become more mainstream. The radical
element of its rhetoric needed to be eliminated and replaced with political correctness and
modern values. In her 2010 bid to become the new President of the FN, Marine Le Pen
promised to do just that with her dédiabolisation [de-demonization] strategy - compared
to her competitor Bruno Gollnisch who remained steeped in historical negationism and
ties to conservative Catholic stances. After winning the vote to become the party’s new
President, MLP boldly declared that the Front National was not a far right-wing party,
but a party for France and the French people.13

13

The last phase, la renaissance possible, gives an overview of the initial changes and potential obstacles
for the party under MLP’s leadership.
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RHETORICAL SHIFTS BETWEEN JMLP AND MLP
Scholars of the Front National vary on when they claim that the party shifted its
rhetoric toward populism; however, the claim that there has been a shift is
widespread. Originally, the FN was considered to be a far-right political party under
JMLP. Indeed, the party embraced the idea that it was an outsider with “priorités
radicalement différentes” [radically different priorities] (Shields 2011). JMLP was seen
as a charismatic politician; his stretch as party president, however, also included several
faux pas which tarnished the FN’s image (Williams 2011). While the National Front is
still considered to be on the political right, MLP, as party president, has restructured its
image around her professional and personal charisma (Gundogar 2013; Mayer
2013). Indeed, she has declared “Je suis la candidate de la révolte populaire face au
système, de la vérité face au mensonge” [I am the representative of the popular revolt
against the system, of the truth in the face of lies].14
Only one systematic analysis has been done comparing JMLP to MLP. Alduy
and Wahnich (2015) looked at 500 texts – public speeches, editorials and radio and TV
interviews – by Jean-Marie and Marine from 1987-2013. They used linguistic software
to ascertain lexical frequency, concordance, semantic networks, word clouds, textual
environment, key words, themes, proper names, neologisms, grammatical categories as
well as to compare their findings with normative reference language. In the end, they
conclude that “Marine Le Pen n’a pas fondamentalement altéré le logiciel de pensée
frontiste : sa version en actualise la présentation et le vocabulaire, non le fond

Marine Le Pen: ‘Je suis la candidate de la révolte populaire.’” 17 February 2012. Le Parisien.
http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-politique/marine-le-pen-je-suis-la-candidate-de-la-revoltepopulaire-17-02-2
14
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idéologique” [Marine Le Pen has not fundamentally altered the program of Frontist
thought: her version only updates its presentation and its vocabulary, not its ideological
foundation]. 15
Three other authors have conducted qualitative analyses. Gundogar (2013)
describes how JMLP used populist rhetoric, but came to represent outdated concerns and
policy solutions – such as communism and repatriation of immigrants – as France’s
contextual factors changed. MLP, then, in turn, utilized her political abilities along with
capitalizing on updated issues in order to rebrand the party. Mayer (2013) completed a
structured case study of JMLP and MLP. She argues that MLP capitalized on the
populist trend that was already underway during JMLP’s leadership. Williams (2011)
looked at both lateral and source factors behind recent FN success. She concludes that
JMLP and MLP are both charismatic leaders who used catch-all strategies; however,
while mistakes made by JMLP hindered the party, MLP does not have such baggage to
weigh her down.
Several other scholars have honed in on MLP’s rhetoric alone. Baider (2015)
looked at MLP’s rhetoric from 2011-2015. In particular, he looked at words that were
specifically used by the FN as well as looked at the context surrounding the use of
emotion words; he concluded that such words embodied a sense of
protectionism. Bastow (2018) argues that overall the Front National under MLP is
ideologically similar to that under JMLP’s leadership. The only difference is that MLP
has toned down controversial language and put more emphasis on the economy following
similar European populist movements. Goodliffe (2016) discusses the party’s reimaging
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Alduy & Wahnich 2012, p. 116.
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of itself via dédiabolisation [de-demonization]. He notes MLP’s increased economic and
republican rhetoric while toning down radical rhetoric. Stockemer (2014) claims that the
National Front has always used a degree of populist rhetoric; MLP just strove to bring it
to the forefront. Mondon (2014) acknowledges that much of what has led to MLP’s
success was laid by her father. However, the crux to her rise was Sarkozy’s cooptation of
FN stances which allowed them to enter the mainstream. Since then, MLP has been able
to jump on the populist resurgence.
Overall, FN scholars note that JMLP used xenophobic, exclusionist, and racist
rhetoric. Indeed, he appealed to conservative morality and harsh justice. On the other
side, MLP has toned down such language, instead focusing on her relatability to people
as well as appealing to their common sense. She sets herself up as the defender of French
sovereignty and values such as laïcité [secularism] – that is the separation of religion
from the civic sphere. She openly accepts abortion, homosexuality, and civil
unions. Moreover, MLP appeals to the sense of exploitation among people by the
establishment, in particular criticizing the European Union, corporatism, and
globalization. However, both JMLP and MLP capitalized on crises, creating lists of
enemies – most prominent being immigrants – that they argue threatened French security
and identity. Based on my review of the literature, I have combined various scholarly
claims concerning the rhetoric used by MLP compared to JMLP as well as where they
overlap into a chart (see the Appendix, p. 69).
Clearly, there has been a rhetorical shift between JMLP and MLP, in particular
with regards to the perception that MLP uses populist rhetoric. However, there has been
no systematic analysis of this claim, merely observations. While Alduy and Wahnich
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(2015) conducted a comprehensive comparison of JMLP and MLP, they did not
specifically analyze populist rhetoric and only included MLP’s rhetoric up to 2013. The
qualitative studies by Gundogar (2013), Mayer (2013), and Williams (2011) provide
insight into the reasons behind a populist rhetorical shift, but fail to quantitatively back
up their assumption that such a shift has occurred. Likewise, their research does not
include MLP’s more recent rhetoric. More contemporary analyses of MLP’s rhetoric
alone make pertinent observations; however, they lack structured analysis as well as fail
to provide solid comparison to JMLP. Ultimately, this gap merits a quantitative analysis
on the populist rhetoric of JMLP and MLP to establish first if a shift has occurred and
second if the shift hinged on a change in leadership or constitutes a linear trajectory.
From the literary debates, three broad camps emerge concerning the degree to
which JMLP used or did not use populist rhetoric as compared to MLP – that is the
semantic camp, the dédiabolisation camp, and the bandwagon camp. While these camps
overlap in many respects, I have divided them for a more thorough discussion. First, the
semantic camp claims that there has been no foundational change to MLP’s populist
rhetoric as compared to JMLP, merely updating. Next, the dédiabolisation camp argues
that there has been a concentrated effort by MLP to decrease controversial ideas
promoted by JMLP and increase discussion of more mainstream issues. Lastly, the
bandwagon camp implies that MLP has jumped on board with populist rhetoric
movement in order to better appeal to voters but hasn’t necessarily sought to deradicalize
its rhetoric. Moreover, several scholars add in the variables of xenophobic and economic
rhetoric, arguing that there has been a decrease in the former and an increase in the
latter. While the different FN scholars do not all directly address the question concerning
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populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric and whether there has been a change or not,
I have drawn on their articles to create three testable hypotheses.
For Hypothesis 1, the use of populist rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has
experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. Alduy & Wahnich, Mayer, Stochemer,
Williams argue there has been no change. This perspective is linked to semantic camp as
well as the dédiabolisation camp. Indeed, this stems from the idea that MLP uses similar
populist rhetoric as JMLP but has sought to deradicalize the party by eliminating extreme
rhetoric and mainstreaming the party by focusing on economic rhetoric. Bastow,
Goodliffe, Gundogar, Mondon argue there has been an increase. This is founded on the
bandwagon camp which argues that MLP is trying to expand the party base and
consciously use the populist label.
For Hypothesis 2, the use of xenophobic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has
experienced either a) no change or b) a decrease. According to Alduy & Wahnich, there
has been no change, merely word replacement. This falls into the semantic camp.
Bastow, Gundogar, Goodliffe, Mayer, Mondon, Stockemer, and Williams argue there has
been a decrease. This position originates in the dédiabolisation strategy of the party and
desire to become more mainstream.
For Hypothesis 3, the use of economic rhetoric by MLP compared to JMLP has
experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. Alduy & Wahnich, Bastow, Gundogar,
Goodliffe, Mayer, and Williams argue there has been an increase. For Alduy &
Wahnich, this stance comes from their quantitative analysis which found that MLP
referenced economic terms more than JMLP. For those in the dédiabolisation camp, it
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derives from MLP’s attempt to mainstream. Mondon and Stockemer do not specifically
comment on economic rhetoric.
I have organized these hypotheses in the Table 1 – Hypotheses:
Table 1 - Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Populist Rhetoric

Xenophobic Rhetoric

Economic Rhetoric

The use of populist rhetoric The use of xenophobic

The use of economic

by MLP compared to

rhetoric by MLP compared

rhetoric by MLP compared

JMLP has experienced:

to JMLP has experienced:

to JMLP has experienced:

H1a) No change

H2a) No change

H3a) No change

H1b) An increase

H2b) A decrease

H3b) An increase

For my research I test these three hypotheses by quantifying the populist rhetoric
as well as xenophobic and economic rhetoric used by JMLP and MLP in their campaign
speeches. To do this, I break each type of rhetoric into subcategories with lists of words
representative of each category. The quantitative data I obtain clarifies whether the use
of populist rhetoric by the FN is genuinely new or if the populist rhetoric stands out due
to the reduction in xenophobic rhetoric and the augmentation of economic
rhetoric. Overall, this is a needed analysis not only to settle scholarly debate, but also to
provide insight into the connection between the Front National’s success and use of
populist rhetoric. Moreover, my findings will be able to be applied to research on other
far right-wing populist leaders and their appeal.
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METHODOLOGY
In order to provide insight into the use of populist rhetoric under JMLP and MLP
as well as its potential increase under MLP along with a decrease in xenophobic rhetoric
and increase in economic rhetoric, I conducted an inductive mixed methods research
project using a dictionary-based analysis on all campaign speeches and a content-based
analysis on a random selection of campaign speeches. In comparison to the qualitative
work done by several other Front National scholars (Almeida 2013; Bastow 2018;
Goodliffe 2016; Gundogar 2013; Mayer 2013; Mondon 2014; Shields 2013 & 2014;
Stockemer 2014; Williams 2011), a dictionary-based analysis provided for systematic
review and tangible results on broader trends. A content-based analysis allowed me to
validate my qualitative results. I was able to take into account context, catch false
positives, as well as identify nuances other scholars have not yet addressed. These
methods enabled me to test the assertion as to whether MLP has increased the use of
populist rhetoric compared to JMLP and to lay the groundwork for future research on the
connection between the use of populist rhetoric and mainstream electoral acceptance.
In the research conducted by Alduy and Wahnich, they compiled and organized
the public speeches, editorials, radio, and TV interviews for both JMLP and MLP from
1987-2013.16 For the purpose of my research, I used their list of the campaign speeches found under discours - from 2002, 2007, and 2012. For MLP’s 2017 campaign speeches,
I found them on the FN’s website - found under discours de Marine Le Pen. I define
campaign speech as verbal rhetoric in which a candidate discusses their platform
pertaining to the position they seek in an open forum in front of an electorate

16

The complete list can be found at https://decodingmarinelepen.stanford.edu/corpus.
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audience. First, this eliminates any written rhetoric. Second, it distinguishes different
types of possible speech, in particular that presented in a press conference to the media
and/or a one-on-one interview with a varied viewership. My definition of campaign
speech provides an isolated connection between the political leader and the potential
voter.
For each speech, I obtained videos and/or French transcriptions from the Front
National’s website17 (now the Rassemblement National), Youtube, and an open access
public speech database compiled by the French Office of Legal and Administrative
Information18. For the video speeches that did not have an accompanying transcription, I
transcribed them. There were three speeches for JMLP and four for MLP, for a total of
seven speeches, for which I was unable to find a video or a transcription. I excluded
these speeches from my analysis. I do not believe this exclusion contains systematic bias,
as they were completely random exclusions due merely to their lack of availability on the
internet. There were three speeches entitled voeux or voeux à la presse [press
conferences] – one from JMLP from 2002 and two from MLP from 2012 – listed under
discours on the decodingmarinelepen.com website. I excluded these from my analysis as
they are press greetings and do not fit my definition of campaign speech. From the
speeches I obtained from the Front National’s website, there were five speeches which I
excluded from my analysis. One was a video message, not a campaign speech. Two
were actually press conferences. One was a questions and answer in a closed meeting.
The last one was a speech given outside of France in Chad to the Chadian parliament. In
the end, for JMLP from 2001-2002, there is a total of 13 speeches. For JMLP from 2006-

17
18

See https://www.rassemblementnational.fr/.
See and http://www.vie-publique.fr/.
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2007 there is a total of 27 speeches. For MLP from 2011-2012 there is a total of 23
speeches. For MLP from 2016-2017 there is a total of 37 speeches. In all, there is a total
100 speeches. For a list of all speeches organized by campaign, see the Appendix, p. 7078.
Before beginning my analysis of the campaign speeches, I ran two pilot tests to
lay the groundwork for my dictionary-based and content-based analyses. I removed the
speeches used for my pilot tests from the final sampling. For the first test I randomly
selected one speech from each campaign, for a total of four speeches.19 From each
speech, I compiled an n-gram dictionary of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric.
Here n represents the total number, while gram represents words. Thus, my n-gram
dictionary constitutes one, two, three, etc. word sequences. In the end, the largest portion
of my dictionary n-grams were one word with the largest n-gram being three words.
When determining what word phrases were populist, I based my selections on
Mudde’s definition of populism – that is anti-elitism and anti-pluralism with an appeal to
the people. For anti-elite words, I selected words that represented political and elite
classes. For anti-pluralist words, I honed in on words that embody a unified people and
cultural protection. For appeals to the people words, I found words that represented
justified emotions and citizenry power. Examples of each category include words like
Bruxelles [Brussels] which is anti-elite because it is where the European Union
Headquarters are located, société française [French society] which falls under anti-

19

Speeches Used:
JMLP: 1) March 3, 2002, Lille, Discours de Lille Meeting and 2) November 12, 2006, Le Bourget,
Discours du Bourget.
MLP: 1) February 26, 2012, Val-de-Loire, Discours de Châteauroux and 2) April 9, 2017, Ajaccio,
Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Ajaccio.
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pluralism because of its idealization of a homogenous culture, and colère du peuple
[anger of the people] which is an appeal to the people through its assumption that
ordinary citizens are right in this feeling.
For xenophobic rhetoric, I created two categories: exclusionary populism and
overt xenophobia. For exclusionary populism, I chose words that aimed to prevent
groups from 1) receiving state benefits, 2) engaging in the democratic process, and 3)
being considered part of “the people”. This encompassed exclusionary measures such as
barrière [barrier]. For overt xenophobia, I selected words that embodied a negative
reference to other ethnic identities, at times inciting fear, hatred, and hostility, with a
belief that people have an inherent right to live separately from these other ethnicities.
This included ethnic words like beur [a child of North African immigrants] as well as
inciting words like invasion [invasion]. For both my populist and xenophobic rhetoric
words, I also utilized Alduy’s (2017) breakdown of words used by major French
politicians, in particular the chapter on MLP20, in her most recent book just prior to the
French 2017 presidential elections.
For economic rhetoric, I split into two categories: general economy and rightwing populist economic. For the general economy, I selected words like chômage
[unemployment] as well as used the economic word dictionary already created by Alduy
and Wahnich (2015)21 in their analysis. For the right-wing populist economic category, I
chose words that encompassed anti-global sentiments - such as mondialism sauvage
[unbridled globalism] - and protectionist perspectives - like patriotisme économique
[economic patriotism].

20
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See Alduy 2017, p. 115-162.
See Alduy & Wahnich 2015, p. 34-41.
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When necessary, I stemmed certain words - that is remove the word end to reduce
it to its base root - in order to streamline searchability. As I went through the speeches, I
adjusted my dictionary by removing outliers and overly general words so as to hone in on
the desired speech to measure (Grimmer & Stewart 2013). In order to cross check and
increase the robustness of my dictionary, I also used the programmes des candidats á la
présidentielles [candidate platforms]22 from both JMLP and MLP from each election to
derive more n-grams. I choose the programmes présidentiels in particular for their direct
relation to the campaign speeches in my analysis and similar target audience as well as
for their systematic and bulleted organization.
The results of my first test are as follows:
1) Populist Rhetoric
a. Anti-elite total words: 57
b. Anti-pluralist total words: 59
c. Appeal to people total words: 10
2) Xenophobic Rhetoric
a. Exclusionary populism total words: 29
b. Overt xenophobia total words: 22
3) Economic Rhetoric
a. General economy total words: 68
b. Right-wing populist economics total words: 41
These results are the dictionary for my dictionary-based analysis. For a complete list, see
the Appendix, Table 8 - Rhetoric Dictionary.
For the second test, I created a coding scheme using descriptive codes – a word or
phrase that summarizes the overall concept of a short passage in a text (Saldaña
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Programmes Présidentielles (also see the Appendix, p. 70):
JMLP: 1) April 2002, Programme de M. Jean-Marie Le Pen, http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023001406.html and 2) March 2007, Programme électoral de Jean-Marie Le Pen,
http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/073001250.html.
MLP: 1) January 2012, Programme de Mme Marine Le Pen, http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/123000632.html and 2) April 2017, 144 Engagements Présidentiels,
https://rassemblementnational.fr/pdf/144-engagements.pdf.
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2015). The foundation for my descriptive codes comes from my research on populism,
populist rhetoric, and far-right wing parties (Betz & Immerfall 1998, 2004, 2016; Golder
2016; Mudde 2007; Wodak 2015). On top of that, I drew from my readings of populist
right-wing scholars (Mudde 2007; Wodak 2015) and the creation of my dictionary, such
as the need for a far-right wing populist economics category. Next, I read through one
randomly selected campaign speech in order to hand code the document according to my
scheme. As I hand coded, I made any necessary adjustments to the scheme in order to
better reflect key concepts. I also noted any encapsulating quotes.
Based on my reading, my initial coding scheme included the overarching
categories of democracy, list of enemies, appeals, charismatic leader, economy, and
phrasing. These categories included various subcategories like 1) the party represents the
will/voice of the people, 2) political elite, 3) exploitation, 4) plain language, 5) antiglobalization, and 6) black and white options. After creating my dictionary, however, I
realized that the larger categories did not address the focus of my hypotheses, namely
populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric. Moreover, the analysis of a charismatic
leader is currently beyond the scope of my research. As a result, I revised the categories
to the following:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Anti-elitism
Anti-pluralism
Appeal to people
Exclusionary populism
Far-right wing populist economics
Phrasing

For the new categories I added, subcategories included concepts like 1) political elite, 2)
French identity, 3) national preference, and 4) economic patriotism. I adjusted some of
the subcategories while I was coding. For example, I delineated several more types of
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appeals to the people. This coding scheme is the base for my content-based analysis. For
the entire coding scheme, see the Appendix.
As I coded the speech, some rhetoric fit cleanly into a category and
subcategory. For example, a reference against multiculturalism fell under anti-pluralism.
Other rhetoric fit into the same category and multiple subcategories within that category,
such as appeals that spoke to a sense of exploitation and a loss of control. A few sections
fit into multiple categories like references that were anti-elite in nature while also
critiquing their relation to France’s economic situation. I did not find examples of all
subcategories I listed in this particular speech. This most likely is not an issue because it
is possible for a concept to not occur in every case example. Overall, my coding scheme
adds value to my analysis by allowing me to better catch all relevant dimensions, in
particular context. Having a better sense of the context around my dictionary words
enables me to cross-check their validity. Moreover, a qualitative analysis provides
insight into the attribute of a charismatic leader associated with populist rhetoric. While I
am not testing this in my thesis, it may prove valuable for future research.
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RESULTS
In my results section, I lay out the procedures used in my dictionary-based
quantitative analysis and content-based qualitative analysis. Next, I provide the data
obtained in my dictionary-based analysis of each set of campaign speeches, incorporating
my content-based qualitative analysis to provide context. Then, I test my three
hypotheses, comparing JMLP’s sets of campaign speeches against MLP’s. Lastly, I
discuss and analyze my findings in terms of the broader scholarly debate.

Dictionary-based Quantitative Analysis & Content-based Qualitative Analysis
For my dictionary-based quantitative analysis, using the content analysis software
Yoshikoder, I first uploaded my dictionary. Next, I uploaded a text document for each
campaign which contained all the speeches. I ran a report for each category in my
dictionary. This provided me with an overall count of how many times the words in that
category were found in the speeches as well as the proportion of those words compared to
other words not being measured. I then ran a concordance to obtain an alphabetical list
of the words from my dictionary found in the speeches. This provided an exact count of
the use of each word in each category as well as the passage around each word.
As I ran through my initial analysis I needed to refine broader stem words such as
mondial* [world/globe] and nation* [nation] in order to refine results. In several
categories, I pinpointed false positives. For example, in the anti-elite category, the stem
liber* resulted in the word liberté [liberty]. This was a word I specifically excluded from
my dictionary due to its generalizability in French political parlance. As a result, I
replaced the stem liber* with the exact words I aimed to hit, such as libéral and libéraux
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[liberal]. Another example is in the exclusionary populist category; the stem ferm*
resulted in the word ferme [farm]. Consequently, I narrowed the search to the specific
words fermer [to close] and fermeture [closure]. In the category of general economy, the
main results for the stem libéralis* [to liberalize] resulted in right-wing populist
economic contexts. Consequently, I moved that stem search from the general economy
category to the right-wing populist economics category.
In the presentation of my results, I provide the percentage total for the use of each
rhetorical category in relation to each set of campaign speeches. The percentage allows
for a measurement of the number of times the rhetoric was used in relation to the
whole. Then, I list the top three most frequently used words along with their percent
usage for each category in order to hone in on the most prominent themes found in each
set of campaign speeches.
For the content-based analysis, I randomly selected two speeches from each
campaign, ensuring that the speeches were from diverse dates and locations.23 I then read
through each speech and coded passages according to my coding scheme. As I coded
passages, most encompassed several sub-categories. For example, a passage by MLP
referenced the category of anti-elitism with the sub-category of economic elite, the
category of appeal to the people with the subcategories of sense of exploitation and
patriotism/sovereignty, and the category of far-right wing populist economics with the
subcategory of economic patriotism. For other passages, I had difficulty determining the
exact subcategory they fell under. For example, a discussion about immigration

23

See the Appendix, p. 70-78, for a list of speeches delineated out by campaign.
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contained underlying tones of the subcategories fear of disruption and insecurity and loss
of control. For such instances, I coded the phrase as containing both subcategories.

JMLP Campaign Speeches 2001-2002 Analysis Results
For JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign speeches, 42.37% of the rhetoric coded for this
project was populist, with a breakdown of 11.86% anti-elite, 28.95% anti-pluralist, and
1.56% appeal to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 197 word count, the
top three most frequently used words were finac* [such as financier (financial)] (18.7%),
socialis* [for example socialiste (socialist) and socialisme (socialism)] (15.2%), and a tie
between Bruxelles [Brussels] and américain [American] (both 8.6%). JMLP’s frequent
reference to socialism falls in line with scholarly claims (see Hainsworth 2004) about his
virulent anti-communism. According to my coding scheme, under the subcategory of
foreign country, JMLP heavily emphasized and criticized American influence on Europe
and France. For example, he states that:
Since France has renounced its national sovereignty, it no longer has control
over its political or military policy, both of which have been conceded to the
United States through the European Union which it controls through Germany, its
closest ally.24
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 481 word count, the top three
most frequently used words were national* [for example nationalisme (nationalism)]
(32.8%), nationalité [nationality]* (10.1%), and souverain* [such as souveraine
(sovereign) and souveraineté (sovereignty)] (9.9%). These results correspond to

« La France ayant renoncé à être une nation souveraine n'a plus de politique étrangère ni de politique
militaire, l'une et l'autre, étant désormais concédées aux Etats-Unis, à travers l'Union Européenne qu'ils
contrôlent par l'Allemagne, leur alliée la plus sûre ». JMLP, 2001, 18 August, La Trinité-sur-mer,
Discours de La Trinité sur mer meeting.
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scholarly observations about JMLP’s frequent references to the fatherland and
traditionalism (see Hainsworth 2004). According to my coding scheme, under the subcategories of French identity, protection, and patriotism/sovereignty, JMLP proclaims
that:
Here is the stigmatization technique used on patriots: it is the technique
according to which any valorization of traditions and the Nation is immediately
suspected of Hitlerian sympathy, which one will suggest directly, or more
skillfully, by speaking for example about a speech about control of migratory
flows as a discourse ‘that brings us back to the darkest hours of our history’. [...]
We must preserve the sovereignty of France.25
Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 26 word count, there were
only two words used: responsabilité [responsibility] (53.8%) and référend* [referendum]
(46%). While mentioned by some scholars, these results highlight that JMLP sought to
utilize a method that is seen as key to populism: referendum. According to my coding
scheme, under the sub-category of referendum, JMLP proposes that:
In order to loosen the grip and effectively respond to the shadow of tyranny, we
must use targeted and intelligent mechanisms of direct democracy, such as
referendum.26
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 26.54%. 15.71% of the rhetoric was
in the exclusionary populist category. Out of a total 261 word count, the top three most
frequently used words were étrang* [such as étranger (foreign) and étrangère
(foreigner)] (29.5%), sécurité [security] (18.7%), and immigré [immigrant] (9.1%).
10.83% of the rhetoric was in the overt xenophobia category. Out of a total 180 word

« Les techniques de stigmatisation des patriotes : c'est la technique selon laquelle toute valorisation des
traditions et de la nation est immédiatement suspectée de sympathie hitlérienne, ce que l'on suggérera
directement, ou plus habilement, en parlant par exemple d'un discours de contrôle des flux migratoires
comme d'un discours ‘qui nous ramène aux heures les plus sombres de notre histoire’. [...] Il faut préserver
la souveraineté de la France.» JMLP, 2002, 21 February, Paris, Discours de Paris colloque.
26
« Pour desserrer l'étau et répondre efficacement à cette tyrannie de l'ombre, il faut utiliser d'une manière
ciblée et intelligente les mécanismes de démocratie directe tels que le référendum ». Ibid.
25
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count, the top three most frequently used words were terror* [such as terrorisme
(terrorism)] (30%), fondamental* [like fondamentalisme (fundamentalism)] (12.7%), and
danger [danger] (7.7%). However, the words islam* [for example Islam and Islamic] and
musulman* [Muslim] were both close behind at 7.2%. This agrees with scholarly
statements that JMLP used xenophobic rhetoric and, in particular, expressed antiimmigration views (see Goodliffe 2016, Hainsworth 2004, and Reynie 2011). According
to my coding scheme, under the sub-category of immigration, JMLP points out that
uncontrolled immigration leads to the disintegration of French Republican values,
unemployment, urban ghettos, increased government spending, and insecurity. He
declares that:
Today’s immigration challenges our concept of the Republic (multiculturalism
versus unity), our concept of education (the Islamic headscarf versus secularism),
our concept of the family (polygamy versus monogamy), and our concept of
women’s rights (excision versus respect for women).27
For economic rhetoric, there was 31.05% with a breakdown of 25.64% general
economy and 5.41% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy
category, out of a total 426 word count, the top three most frequently used words were
économ* [for example économie (economy) and économique (economic)] (19.9%), a tie
between chôm* [for example chômage (unemployment) and chômeur (unemployed)] and
développ* [to develop] (both 7.9%), and retraite [retirement] (6.8%). Within the rightwing populist economics category, out of a total of 90 word count, the top three most
frequently used words were agric* [such as agricole (agricultural), agriculture

« L'immigration d'aujourd'hui met donc notamment en cause notre conception de la République
(multiculturalisme contre unité), notre conception de l'école (foulard islamique contre laïcité), notre
conception de la famille (polygamie contre monogamie) et notre conception de la femme (excision contre
respect de la femme) ». JMLP, 2002, 21 February, Paris, Discours de Paris colloque.
27
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(agriculture), and agriculteurs (farmers)] (48.8%), rétabl* [to restore] (15.5%), and
mondialisation [globalization] (11.1%). While scholars agree that JMLP used economic
rhetoric – many do not mention it –, the use of anti-globalist and pro small business
sentiments are largely attributed to MLP (see Goodliffe 2016, Mondon 2015, and
Williams 2011). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of antiglobalization and political/economic elite, JMLP vents that:
With the Euro, our economy, our agriculture, and our jobs will escape our
control. We will become a people of helots, delivered defenseless to the New
World Order, of which the federalist Europe is nothing but a stage and a cover.28
Overall, JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign speeches largely focus on an anti-pluralist
message surrounding the preservation of the French nation, its culture, and its sovereignty
against globalization. Indeed, he emphasizes the need for increased security against
outsiders. He also calls for the development of France’s economy as well as reduction of
the unemployment rate and preservation of retirement benefits. Figure 4 shows a
comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign
speeches.29

« Par l'Euro, notre économie, notre agriculture, nos métiers échapperont à notre volonté. Nous
deviendrons un peuple d'ilotes, livré sans défense au Nouvel Ordre Mondial dont l'Europe fédérale n'est
qu'une étape et une couverture ». JMLP, 2001, 18 August, La Trinité-sur-mer, Discours de La Trinité sur
mer meeting.
29
For a list of top frequently used words by category in JMLP’s campaign speeches from 2001-2002, see
the Appendix, p. 86.
28
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Figure 4: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in JMLP Campaign Speeches
2001-2002

JMLP Campaign Speeches 2006-2007 Analysis Results
For JMLP’s 2006-2007 campaign speeches, there was a total of 44.95% populist
rhetoric with a breakdown of 17.28% anti-elite, 25.63% anti-pluralist, and 2.02% appeal
to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 555 word count, the top three most
frequently used words were finac* [finance] (20.1%), Sarkozy (14.9%), and Bruxelles
[Brussels] (13.1%). The significant use of the word Sarkozy is to be expected, as Nicolas
Sarkozy was the main opposing candidate in the election. According to my coding
scheme, under the sub-category of international organization, JMLP bemoans the control
that international organizations have over French sovereignty. He claims that:
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For over twenty years, the French people have sacrificed their ability to decide,
their political freedom, their sovereignty all for the benefit of Brussels, in the
hope that they would obtain additional resources and services for the future, all
without realizing that our powers, our freedoms, and our liberties entrusted to
Brussels were immediately squandered by the European Commission for the
benefit of the World Trade Organization, the United States, the free trade zones of
the global market, in which we are politically, economically, and socially
crushed.30
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 823 word count, the top three
most frequently used words were national* [national] (28.9%), justice [justice] (9.5%),
and defend* [to defend] (5.46%). The word femme* [women] was close behind at 5.3%.
This corresponds with scholarly claims that JMLP frequently emphasized the need for
law & order (see Mondon 2014 and Williams 2011), which was to be obtained via
righteous justice such as the death penalty. According to my coding scheme, under the
sub-categories of French identity, protection, patriotism/sovereignty, and historical myth,
JMLP argues that:
In order to save our trusted values, because they alone allow for life and
sometimes happiness, we must fight to save their foundations, solidified
throughout our History, which have allowed us to preserve our liberties, our
independence, our security, our culture and our identity through difficult
struggles.31
Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 65 word count, there were
only three words used: responsabilité [responsibility] (61.5%), référend* [referendum]

« Les Français ont donc sacrifié, pendant vingt ans, leur pouvoir de décider, leur liberté politique, leur
Etat au profit de Bruxelles, en espérant obtenir ainsi un supplément de force, de services, d'avenir, sans
s'apercevoir que nos pouvoirs, nos libertés et notre argent ainsi confiés à Bruxelles étaient immédiatement
dilapidés par la Commission européenne au profit de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce, des EtatsUnis, d'un marché commun planétaire construit à coup de zones de libre-échange emboîtées, dans lequel
nous sommes politiquement, économiquement et socialement broyés ». JMLP, 2007, 25 March, Toulouse,
Discours de Toulouse.
31
« Pour sauver les valeurs auxquelles nous sommes attachés, parce qu'elles seules permettent la vie et
parfois le bonheur, nous devons combattre pour sauver les structures, vérifiées par l'Histoire, qui ont
permis au travers de douloureux combats, de préserver nos libertés, notre indépendance, notre sécurité,
notre culture et notre identité ». JMLP, 2006, 22 October, Vendée, Discours aux Herbiers.
30
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(32.3%), and populis* [populist; populism] (6.1%). This is the first explicit use of the
words populisme and populist by JMLP. This speaks to the arguments of few scholars
which claim that the populist trajectory of the Front National began under JMLP
(Gundogar 2013; Mondon 2014). According to my coding scheme, under the subcategories of common sense and referendum, JMLP declares that:
If I am elected, from here on, I solemnly commit to adding an article to the
French Constitution which requires any modification of the European Treaties to
be subject to compulsory consultation of the French people via a referendum.32
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 18.41%. 13.83% of the rhetoric was
exclusionary populist. Out of a total 444 word count, the top three most frequently used
words were sécurité [security] (19.5%), étrang* [foreign] (14.6%), and immigré*
[immigrant] (10.1%). The word lutt* [to fight] was not far behind at 8.1%. For overt
xenophobia, there was a total 4.57%. Out of 147 words, the top three most frequently
used words were fondamental* [fundamental] (22.44%), with a tie between insécurité
[insecurity] (10.8%), musulman* [Muslim] (10.8%), and terror* [terrorist; terrorism]
(10.8%), closely followed by violence [violence] (9.5%). These results uphold the
scholarly view that JMLP’s message was anti-immigration with xenophobic undertones
(Hainsworth 2004; Williams 2011). According to my coding scheme, under the subcategory of immigration, JMLP criticizes France’s acceptance of large numbers of
immigrants. He rails that:

32

Je m'engage dès maintenant, solennellement, si je suis élu, à ajouter à la Constitution française un
article disposant que toute modification des Traités européens fasse l'objet d'une consultation obligatoire
du peuple français par la voie du référendum ». JMLP, 2007, 25 March, Toulouse, Discours de Toulouse.
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Meanwhile, the floodgates of mass immigration have been opened, the state has
continued to spread its generosity to the benefit of people from around the
globe.33
For economic rhetoric, there was a total 36.63% with a breakdown of 29.00%
general economy and 7.63% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy
category, out of a total 931 word count, the top three most frequently used words were
économ* [economy] (16.4%), entrepr* [business; entrepreneurs] (9.9%), and chôm*
[unemployment] (7.8%). Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a
total of 245 word count, the top three most frequently used words were agric*
[agriculture] (42.8%), rétabl* (to restore) (23.6%), and both a tie at 11.0% between
mondialisation [globalization] and global* [global]. These results do not drastically
differ from JMLP’s 2001-2002 campaign speeches which speak to relative scholarly
silence on the matter. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of antiglobalization and loss of control, JMLP asserts that:
To continue down this path that systematizes ultra-free trade, which is rooted in
the suicidal overvalued euro, which contributes to the disappearance of our
agricultural and industrial sectors and leaves us no choice but to raise taxes to
hire new officials, continue on in this way, it's actually taking us on a one-way
trip to the Middle Ages!34
Overall, the focus of JMLP’s 2006-2007 campaign speeches remain similar to that
of his previous campaign - that is largely comprised of anti-pluralist sentiments and
discussion of France’s general economy. His use of anti-elite words increased by 5.42%.
In particular, his criticism of the United-States decreases and is replaced by criticism

« Entre temps, les vannes de l'immigration de masse ont été ouvertes, l'Etat n'a cessé de répandre ses
générosités au bénéfice de populations issues des quatre coins du globe ». Ibid.
34
« Continuer dans une voie qui systématise l'ultra libre-échangisme, qui enracine le suicidaire euro
surévalué, qui organise notre disparition agricole et industrielle et ne nous laisse d'autres choix que
d'augmenter les impôts pour embaucher de nouveaux fonctionnaires, continuer dans cette voie, c'est
effectivement, prendre un aller simple vers le Moyen-âge ». Ibid.
33
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against Nicolas Sarkozy. His use of various anti-pluralist words remains even, with the
exception of the word justice going from 4.7% in the 2001-2002 campaign to 9.5%
usage. Most notably, JMLP’s overall xenophobic rhetoric decreases since his last
campaign, in particular his use of overt xenophobia drops by 6.2%. Figure 5 shows a
comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in JMLP’s 2006-2007 campaign
speeches.35

Figure 5: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in JMLP Campaign Speeches
2006-2007

MLP Campaign Speeches 2011-2012 Analysis Results

For a list of top frequently used words by category in the JMLP’s campaign speeches from 2006-2007,
see the Appendix, p. 86.
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For MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign speeches, there was a total of 52.41% populist
rhetoric with a breakdown of 24.86 % anti-elite, 26.36 % anti-pluralist, and 1.19% appeal
to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 813 word count, the top three most
frequently used words were Sarkozy (20.4%), finac* [finance] (18.5%), and
(banq*/banc* [bank; banking] (11.8%). The use of Hollande was not far behind at 7.5%.
The high use of Sarkozy and Hollande corresponds to them being the main opposing
candidates in the election. It also speaks to the scholarly observation that MLP
frequently scapegoats – in this instance the blame falls on her opponents – and aims to
present herself as outside the box of the political elite (Mondon 2014; Shields 2013; and
Stockemer 2014). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of
economic elite and sense of exploitation, MLP directly criticizes those in the economic
sector who she sees as exploiting the French people. She argues:
Moreover, when you put a ballot in the ballot box, are you really choosing
between several candidates or is the only choice for us that of our master? You
have the choice: BNP Paribas, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs [...] this financial and
banking oligarchy, which gives itself a permanent golden parachute, vacations
and indecent bonuses, but it is from our pockets that it draws endless money. 36
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 862 word count, the top three
most frequently used words were national* [national] (22.0%), defend* [to defend]
(9.1%), and valeur* [value] (8.7%). The word patriot* [patriot] was close behind at
8.0%. These results agree with scholarly claims that MLP emphasizes and seeks to
defend that traditional values of the French Republic (Bastow 2018; Goodliffe

« D'ailleurs, en mettant un bulletin dans l'urne, choisit-on vraiment encore entre plusieurs candidats ou
nous reste-t-il comme seul choix celui de notre maître. Vous avez le choix : BNP Paribas, JP Morgan,
Goldman Sachs [...] cette oligarchie financière et bancaire, qui s'auto-attribue en permanence parachute
doré, retrait de chapeau et bonus indécents, mais c'est dans notre poche qu'elle puise sans fin son argent ».
MLP, 2012, 7 April, Lyon, Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Lyon.
36
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2016). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of French identity,
patriotism/sovereignty, and economic patriotism, MLP declares that:
My friends, we no longer believe in their old utopias of a prosperous, powerful,
united and fraternal European Union. We no longer believe in their evil
European Soviet Union. We, my friends, believe in economic patriotism and
social patriotism. We believe in our national identity. We believe in national
solidarity. We believe in the genius of our civilization, courage, work, merit,
talent, righteousness, honor, freedom. We, my friends, believe in France.37
Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 39 word count, there were
only three words used: responsabilité [responsibility] (53.8%), référend* [referendum]
(38.4%), and populis* [populist; populism] (7.7%). This falls in line with scholarly
observations that MLP seeks to appeal to the common sense of her base (Gundogar 2013;
Mondon 2014). According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of common
sense and future vision, MLP calls the French people to action. She proclaims that:
With you, I will make decisions that will disrupt the establishment. With you I
will make decisions on Europe, immigration, economic and social policy. With
you I will take immediate and concrete measures to influence prices, improve the
purchasing power of retirees, civil servants, employees, workers, and the
unemployed.38
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total 17.79%. 12.72% of the rhetoric was
exclusionary populist. Out of a total 348 word count, the top three most frequently used
words were étrang* [foreign] (18.6%), immigration [immigration] (16.9%), and sécurité

« Mes amis, nous ne croyons plus à leurs vieilles utopies d'une Union Européenne prospère, puissante,
solidaire et fraternelle. Nous ne croyons plus à leurs méchante Union Soviétique européenne. Nous, mes
amis, nous croyons au patriotisme économique, au patriotisme social. Nous croyons à notre identité
nationale. Nous croyons à la solidarité nationale. Nous croyons au génie de notre civilisation, au courage,
au travail, au mérite, au talent, à la droiture, à l'honneur, à la liberté. Nous, mes amis, nous croyons en la
France ». Ibid.
38
« Avec vous, je prendrai des décisions en rupture avec le désordre établi. Avec vous je prendrai des
décisions sur l'Europe, l'immigration, la politique économique et sociale. Avec vous je prendrai des
mesures immédiates et concrètes pour peser sur les prix, pour améliorer le pouvoir d'achat des retraités,
des fonctionnaires, des salariés, des ouvriers, des chômeurs ». Ibid.
37
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[security] (15.8%). For overt xenophobia, there was a total 234 word count. The top
three most frequently used words were insecurité [insecurity] (17.0%), with a tie
between islam* [Islam; Islamic] (15.3%) and violence [violence] (15.3%), followed by
fondamental* [fundamental] (7.7%). The increased use of Islam corresponds with
scholar assertions that MLP attacks it as incompatible with Republican values (Mondon
2015; Reynie 2011). Moreover, these results are consistent with the acknowledgment
that MLP calls for immigration control (Goodliffe 2016; Reynie 2011). According to
my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of immigration and loss of control, MLP
contends that:
The French have conquered the system of generous social protection in
principle, but this system is threatened. It is threatened by immigration; it is
threatened by social fraud; some will say the two are linked, they are partially
right, but only partially. Admittedly, France does not welcome all the misery of
the world, but it already welcomes way too much.39
For economic rhetoric, there was a total 29.78% with a breakdown of 23.24%
general economy and 6.54% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy
category, out of a total 760 word count, the top three most frequently used words were
économ* [economy] (14.2%), entrepr* [business; entrepreneur] (12.7%), and chôm*
[unemployment] (11.8%). Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a
total of 214 word count, the top three most frequently used words were agric*
[agriculture] (36.9%), mondialisation [globalization] (18.6%), and rétabl* [to restore]
(14.4%). These results agree with scholarly claims that MLP calls for financial

« Les français ont conquis un système de protection sociale généreux dans son principe, mais il est
menacé. Il est menacé par l’immigration ; il est menacé par la fraude sociale ; les deux sont liés diront
certains, pour une part ils ont raison, mais pour une part seulement. Certes, la France n’accueille pas
toute la misère du monde, mais elle en accueille déjà beaucoup trop ». Ibid.
39
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regulation, opposes big banks, and focuses on small French businesses (Bastow 2018;
Goodliffe 2016; and Shields 2013). However, they do not significantly differ from the
economic rhetoric results for JMLP. According to my coding scheme, under the subcategories of disaffected (small-medium businesses, working class, rural areas) and
national industry, MLP advocates that:
At all times, in all places, I want to support audacity, I want to repair the
injustice, I want to encourage the entrepreneurial spirit, I want to help job
creation where it is, that is to say among our artisans, our young entrepreneurs,
our very small businesses, our small and medium-sized businesses who fight to
exist every day.40
Overall, MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign message emphasizes anti-elite and antipluralist sentiments along with a discussion of France’s general economy. For instance,
she rails against the political and economic elite, that is Nicolas Sarkozy, François
Hollande, and big banks. Moreover, she envisions the restoration and preservation of
French culture as well as national sovereignty. Indeed, she emphasizes the insecurity and
violence caused by immigration and fundamental Islamism. Her discussion of the
economy encompasses a desire to shrink the power of the financial/banking sector,
support and grow small and medium-sized French businesses, and decrease
unemployment. Figure 6 shows a comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical
category in MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign speeches.41

« En tout temps, en tous lieux, je veux soutenir l'audace, je veux réparer l'injustice, je veux encourager
l'esprit d'entreprise, je veux aider la création d'emplois où elle se trouve c'est-à-dire chez nos artisans, nos
jeunes entrepreneurs, nos très petites entreprises, nos PME [applaudissements] qui chaque jour se battent
pour exister ». Ibid.
41
For a list of top frequently used words by category in MLP’s campaign speeches from 2011-2012, see the
Appendix, p. 86-87.
40
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Figure 6: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in MLP Campaign Speeches
2011-2012

MLP Campaign Speeches 2016-2017 Analysis Results
For MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches, there was a total of 40.36% populist
rhetoric with a breakdown of 11.29% anti-elite, 27.41% anti-pluralist, and 1.66% appeal
to people. Within the anti-elite category, out of a total 557 word count, the top three most
frequently used words were financ* [finance] (24.2%), banq*/banc* [bank; banking]
(15.0%), and administrat* [administration] (9.3%). The words Hollande (8.6%) and
Bruxelles [Brussels] (8.0%) were close behind. The high use of Hollande corresponds to
him being the incumbent president. Moreover, the frequency of references to banks
corresponds to scholarly assertions that MLP has increased her economic discourse, in
particular emphasizing her opposition to entities like the European Union and the
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European Central Bank (Gundogar 2013; Shields 2013). Moreover, these results adhere
to MLP’s appeals of exploitation by the establishment (Mondon 2014). According to my
coding scheme, under the sub-categories of political and economic elite, MLP makes
several comments as follows:
The power that ancients called ‘auctoritas’, that is the power to issue rules, has
been transferred to a foreign authority based in Brussels.42
The powers of money have only won further power under François Hollande,
perhaps advancing more slyly than before, but they are trying to take total
power.43
Within the anti-pluralist category, out of a total 1352 word count, the top three
most frequently used words were national* [national] (20.2%), patriot* [patriot;
patriotism] (9.7%), and cultur* [culture] (7.7%). Words like democrat* [democracy]
(7.3%), defend* [to defend] (7.1%), and souverain* [sovereignty] (7.1%) were not far
behind. These results are consistent with scholarly declarations that MLP presents
herself as the defender of France and its values (Goodliffe 2016; Mondon 2015), and that
she seeks to restore national sovereignty. According to my coding scheme, under the
sub-categories of immigration, border security, and fear of disruption and insecurity,
MLP emphasizes the need to restore national borders, stating that:
The mishandled management of migratory flows, both legal and illegal, have led
to the flooding of our country and the destabilization of entire parts of our
territory.44

« Le pouvoir que les anciens dénommaient « l’auctoritas », c’est-à-dire le pouvoir d’édicter des règles a
été transféré à une autorité étrangère basée à Bruxelles ». MLP, 2017, 27 February, Nantes, Discours de
Marine Le Pen à Nantes.
43
« Les forces de l’argent n’ont fait que gagner en puissance sous François Hollande, avançant peut-être
plus sournoisement qu’auparavant, mais elles tentent de prendre un pouvoir total ». Ibid.
44
« Le laisser-aller en matière de gestion des flux migratoires, légaux comme illégaux, aboutit à la
submersion de notre pays et la déstabilisation de parties entières du territoire ». MLP, 2017, 27 February,
Nantes, Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes.
42
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Within the appeal to the people category, out of a total 82 word count, there were
only two words used: référend* [referendum] (76.8%) and responsabilité [responsibility]
(23.1%). This represents a dramatic increase in the reference to référendum as compared
to the previous sets of campaigns speeches, both from JMLP and MLP. While MLP does
not explicitly use words like populisme, she highlights the need for the people of France
to make their voice heard. These results align with scholarly assertions that MLP not
only seeks to appeal to the common sense of the French people, but also that this is best
done via direct democracy (Goodliffe 2016). According to my coding scheme, under the
sub-categories common sense and referendum, MLP remarks that:
But in the end who will decide? It is you who will decide in the end on the
occasion of the referendum that I will organize at the end of this discussion, at the
end of this negotiation. Nothing will be done without you; nothing will be done
against you.45
For xenophobic rhetoric, there was a total of 26.21%. 14.17% of the rhetoric was
exclusionary populist. Out of a total 699 word count, the top three most frequently used
words were sécurité [security] (20.6%), immigration [immigration] (19.1%), and
étrang* [foreign] (18.8%). For overt xenophobia, there was a 594 word count. The top
three most frequently used words were islam* [Islam; Islamic] (27.1%), terror*
[terrorism] (22.8%), and fondamental* [fundamental] (17.0%). Compared to her 20112012 campaign, MLP greatly increased her use of islam* words by 11.8%. These results
further back scholarly claims that MLP attacks multiculturalism and Islam (Mondon
2015; Reynie 2011). However, they question the argument as to whether MLP has toned

« Mais au final qui déciderait ? C'est vous au final qui déciderez à l'occasion du référendum que
j'organiserai au terme de cette discussion au terme de cette négociation. Rien ne se fera sans vous ; rien ne
se fera contre vous ». MLP, 2017, 28 April, Nice, Meeting de Marine Le Pen à Nice.
45
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down anti-immigration and exclusionist sentiments or not. According to my coding
scheme, under the sub-categories of laïcité [secularism] and fear of disruption and
insecurity, she critiques that:
The permissiveness that allows the principle of secularism to be trampled on
under the guise of pluralist religion allows the ideological provocations from
Islamism to proliferate in canteens, in hospitals, in the streets, on the beach, and
in companies.46
For economic rhetoric, there was a total 33.41% with a breakdown of 27.93%
general economy and 5.47% right-wing populist economics. Within the general economy
category, out of a total 1378 word count, the top three most frequently used words were
econom* [economy] (24.8%), entrepr* [business; entrepreneur] (16.6%), and chôm*
[unemployment] (7.5%). Within the right-wing populist economics category, out of a
total of 270 word count, the top three most frequently used words were agric*
[agriculture] (25.5%), with a tie between mondialisation [globalization] and rétabl* (to
restore) (24.8%), and followed by global* [global] (11.4%). These results maintain that
MLP use economic discourse, in particular emphasizing anti-globalization sentiments,
economic patriotism, and pro small businesses (Goodliffe 2016; Mondon
2015). However, they disagree with scholarly claims that MLP has seen an increase in
economic rhetoric. According to my coding scheme, under the sub-categories of
patriotism/sovereignty, anti-globalization, and national industry, MLP declares that:
Monetary and economic sovereignty allows us to act directly in the service of our
economy, serving our businesses, very small businesses and small and mediumsized businesses, without having permission to ask anyone. It gives us weapons
again globalization, as all sovereign nations are doing; it permits us to adjust our

« Le laxisme qui laisse bafouer le principe de laïcité sous couvert de religion multiplié laisse se
multiplier les provocations idéologiques de la parte d’islamisme dans les cantines, dans les hôpitaux, dans
les rues, sur la plage, et dans les entreprises ». Ibid.
46
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economy as needed rather than lowering wages or destroying our social
protection system.47
Overall, MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches see the continuation of antipluralist and general economic rhetoric, with a significant decrease in anti-elite words
(13.5%) followed by an increase in exclusionary populism (3.5%) and overt xenophobia
(4.8%). For anti-elite sentiments, MLP continues to criticize the established political
administration and the financial sector. While her percentage reference to finance
increases by 5.7% as compared to her previous campaign, her references to political
opponents decrease. With anti-pluralist rhetoric, she emphasizes the need to defend the
French nation and its culture against globalization and the powers that wish to take away
its economic and political sovereignty. In particular, with xenophobic rhetoric, she hones
in on the dangers of Islamism and illegal immigration. In regards to the general
economy, MLP’s message remains the same as in her previous campaign; indeed, she
persists in decrying globalization and calls for the restoration of France’s control over its
economy. Figure 7 shows a comparison of the percentage of each rhetorical category in
MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches.48

« La souveraineté monétaire et économique qui nous permet d’agir directement au service de notre
économie, au service de nos entreprises, TPE et PME, sans avoir de permission à demander à quiconque,
qui nous donne des armes dans la mondialisation, comme le font tous les pays souverains, qui nous permet
d’ajuster notre économie autrement que par la baisse des salaires ou la destruction de notre système de
protection sociale ». MLP, 2017, 27 February, Nantes, Discours de Marine Le Pen à Nantes.
48
For a list of top frequently used words by category in MLP’s campaign speeches from 2016-2017, see the
Appendix, p. 87.
47
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Figure 7: Percentage of Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric in MLP Campaign Speeches
2016-2017

Hypotheses Test & Comparison of JMLP and MLP
In testing my three hypotheses49 with my data for the four sets of campaign
speeches, the overall results are seen below in Figure 8 which plots the change in the
percentage usage of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric over time between
JMLP’s and MLP. The results of the categories contained within each kind of rhetoric
are seen below in Figure 9. Figure 10 shows a comparison of the percentage of usage of
each category of rhetoric between JMLP’s and MLP’s sets of campaign speeches. In my
comparison of the difference between the three rhetorical categories between JMLP and

49

See Table 1 – Hypotheses, p. 22.
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MLP, I hold an increase or decrease of 5% as a notable shift. I chose this threshold due to
the minimal instances of an increase or decrease greater than 5% between JMLP and
MLP. For a less than 1% increase or decrease, I consider this as no change.

Figure 8: Change in Populist, Xenophobic, & Economic Rhetoric Between JMLP & MLP
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Figure 9: Change in Anti-Elite, Anti-Pluralist, Appeals to People, Exclusionary, Overt Xenophobia,
General Economy, & Right-Wing Populist Economic Rhetoric Between JMLP & MLP

Figure 10: Comparison of the Percentage of Anti-Elite, Anti-Pluralist, Appeals to People,
Exclusionary, Overt Xenophobia, General Economy, & Right-Wing Populist Economic Rhetoric in
JMLP & MLP Campaign Speeches
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Hypothesis 1 expects that the use of populist rhetoric of JMLP compared to MLP
has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. In combining the results for both
sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, there was
a 7.01% increase in the use of anti-elite references by MLP. For anti-pluralist references,
there was a 0.81% no change in the use of between JMLP and MLP. In terms of the use
of appeals to people, there was a 0.73% no change between JMLP and MLP. Overall,
with all categories combined, there was a 5.47% increase in the use of populist rhetoric
by MLP.
Hypothesis 2 expects that the use of xenophobic rhetoric of JMLP compared to
MLP has experienced either a) no change or b) a decrease. In combining the results for
both sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, there
was 4.73% decrease in the use of exclusionary references by MLP. For overt
xenophobia, there was 3.79% increase by MLP. Overall, with both categories combined,
there was 0.95% no change between JMLP and MLP.
Hypothesis 3 expects that the use of economic rhetoric of JMLP compared to
MLP has experienced either a) no change or b) an increase. In combining the results for
both sets of campaign speeches for both JMLP and MLP and then comparing them, for
references to the general economy there was 3.47% decrease by MLP. For references to
right-wing populist economics, there was a 1.03% decrease by MLP. Overall, with both
categories combined, there was a 4.49% decrease in the use of economic rhetoric by
MLP. Table 2 – Hypotheses Test represents a summary of my findings.
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Table 2 – Hypotheses Test
Hypothesis 1
Populist Rhetoric
5.47% Increase

Hypothesis 2
Xenophobic Rhetoric
0.95% No Change

Hypothesis 3
Economic Rhetoric
4.29% Decrease

Using an increase or decrease of 5% as a notable shift, my findings show that for
hypotheses 2 and 3 there was no significant change between JMLP and MLP. For
hypothesis 1, the results were over 5% by .47%. This is unexpected. First, for Hypothesis
1, from my review of the literature, I anticipated there would be a visible increase in
overall populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP. However, the results show the
increase was relatively small in populist rhetoric. Between the different categories found
under populist rhetoric, the initial increase in anti-elite rhetoric found in MLP’s 20112012 campaign speeches corresponds to scholarly observations. However, the MLP’s
use of anti-pluralist sentiments and use of appeals to the people remains even to JMLP.
The finding of a subsequent decline in populist rhetoric by MLP in her 2016-2017
campaign speeches can be accounted for in that no other scholar had included her most
recent rhetoric in their research.
Second, for Hypothesis 2, again from my review of the literature, I expected there
to be a decrease in xenophobic rhetoric between JMLP and MLP. Instead, there was a
decrease in the use of exclusionary populism by MLP, but an increase in overt
xenophobia. In order to account for this finding, I combined the results from the antipluralist category under populist rhetoric with the results from both the exclusionary
populist and overt xenophobia categories, since both are a subset of anti-pluralism. From
this comparison, there was a 1.76% decrease by MLP.
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Lastly, for economic rhetoric, based on the literature I expected to see an increase
between JMLP and MLP. However, there was a decrease in the use of economic
references. For MLP’s 2011-2012 campaign speeches, this can likely be explained by
her anti-elite criticism, specifically of economic elite, overtaking her discussion of
economics. Consequently, she hits two birds with one stone by referencing economic
topics with a populist overtone. This lends to the perception of an increase in economic
rhetoric while actually increasing her populist rhetoric. Then, in MLP’s 2016-2017
campaign speeches, she replaces her anti-elite rhetoric with increased overt xenophobia.
In sum, the data suggests that while there may have appeared to be an increase in
populist rhetoric under MLP’s first campaign, her subsequent campaign shows that this is
not a significant trend. Indeed, my results illustrate how there is only a marginal .47%
increase in the percentage of populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP.
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DISCUSSION
In my review of scholarly claims concerning the Front National’s shift towards
populist rhetoric, I outlined three different camps. The first is the semantic camp which
argues that there has been no foundational change to MLP’s rhetoric as compared to
JMLP’s, merely updating to the context of the time. The second is the dédiabolisation
camp which argues that MLP has made a concentrated effort to decrease controversial
ideas promoted by JMLP and increase discussion of more mainstream issues. The third
is the bandwagon camp which claims that MLP has joined the populist rhetoric
movement trend.
Due to there being only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric
between JMLP and MLP, I believe my results are most in line with the semantic
camp. In particular, the systematic analysis conducted by Alduy and Wahnich (2015)
which concluded that MLP has updated the Front National’s style of presentation and has
altered aspects of its vocabulary. Indeed, I argue that the perception of an increase in
populist and economic rhetoric under MLP seems to do more with appearance than
quantitative fact. This speaks to the idea that while there is a populist rhetoric movement
occurring, it is the increased saliency of populist rhetoric which makes it appear that
MLP has increased in populist rhetoric. This corresponds with Mayer’s (2015) and
Mondon’s (2014) findings which state that the FN’s move towards populism began under
JMLP and that MLP has merely continued to capitalize on the current populist
trend. Mondon (2014) in particular asserts that it was Nicolas Sarkozy’s cooptation of
Front National stances which have allowed for the party’s message under MLP to appear
more mainstream. While the details of the rise of the association between the Front
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National and populism is beyond the scope of this paper, a future analysis that takes into
account rhetoric from other French political party leaders could shed light on this.
A notable exception to my argument is the spike in anti-elite rhetoric used by
MLP in her 2011-2012 campaign speeches and the increase in exclusionary rhetoric used
in her 2016-2017 campaign speeches. These changes could be accounted for first by the
idea that a change in leadership will result in some rhetorical differences. Moreover,
these spikes could correspond with the MLP’s rhetorical responsiveness to exogenous
factors – such as the refugee wave sweeping across Europe and an increase in
fundamentalist Islamic terrorist attacks in France – which happen to fall in line with those
categories during those time periods. While an examination of contextual factors is
beyond the scope of this paper, future research on the relation between current events and
the rhetoric used by MLP would prove insightful. Indeed, an overall expansion of my
research to include MLP’s speeches between both her two campaigns would give
structure to the shift from the increase in anti-elite rhetoric to the increase in exclusionary
rhetoric.
As for dédiabolisation - or dedemonization - of FN rhetoric, my n-gram and
qualitative results show that this comes from a decrease in the use of certain words/ideas
- like anti-Americanism and the death penalty - by MLP. However, concepts that are no
longer popular have been replaced with popular ones, like fear of Islamism and mass
immigration. This falls in line with the argument made by Gundogar (2013) who holds
that the FN has made a concentrated effort to normalize its rhetoric. However, the
rhetoric of JMLP goes back much further than the two sets of campaign speeches I
analyzed. Consequently, an expanded timeframe on the rhetoric of JMLP might show
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that there has indeed been a more drastic decrease in controversial language and overt
xenophobia. Alternatively, my results may speak to William’s (2011) argument that,
since MLP has not been president of the Front National as long as JMLP was and has
been careful with her message, she has not made mistakes like he did to tarnish the
party’s image and label it as xenophobic and racist.
With respects to economic rhetoric, of the scholars that mention a change between
JMLP and MLP (see Alduy & Wahnich 2015; Bastow 2018; Goodliffe 2016; Gundogar
2013; Mayer 2013; Williams 2011), they all argue there has been an increase under
MLP. However, my results show there has been an overall decrease. The main possible
reason for this difference of observation is that there was a spike in economic rhetoric by
MLP in her 2011-2012 campaign speeches. This corresponds with permeation across
Europe of the 2008 economic recession. This is the point to which most scholars base
their observations on. Indeed, the most comprehensive by Alduy & Wahnich (2015) only
went to the end of that campaign. In her 2016-2017 campaign speeches, though, MLP
maintains an even discussion of the general economy, but replaces her criticism of
economic elite – which comprised much of her economic rhetoric previously –, with an
increased overt xenophobic message.
As for the National Front’s increasing electoral success under MLP, my results
suggest this is not due to an increase in populist rhetoric. Rather, the party’s appeal to
voters may have more to due with cooptation of traditionally far-right issues by
mainstream French political parties50, pertinent contextual factors which either align with
the Front National’s message or which the FN molds their message around, and the

50

During the 2017 French presidential elections, Alduy (2017) measured and compared the most frequently
used words among the top candidates, including MLP.
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saliency of these issues among voters. Overall, further analysis would be needed to
measure the impact of each of these possibilities on why the French people vote for the
FN. In particular, an analysis of the role that media has played in the presentation of
MLP, the party, and a possible connection with populism could further elucidate why
assertions about a populist rhetorical shift have been hypothesized.

60
CONCLUSION
Scholars of the Front National have postulated several arguments as to whether
and when the party’s rhetoric moved towards populism. Some claimed that the shift
began under JMLP; others assert that the cooptation of FN issues by Nicolas Sarkozy
launched its rhetoric into the mainstream; others argue that rising party leaders like MLP
spearheaded the transition; lastly, some counter that the Front National’s rhetoric has not
shifted towards populism.
The quantitative analysis of my thesis gives concrete numbers to this
debate. Namely that there has been a relatively small increase in the populist rhetoric
used between JMLP and MLP. However, at a time when the saliency of populism
increased, the FN experienced a leadership change. This provided the party the
opportunity to change its image in many respects as well as update the context of key
issues.
While my findings provide insight as to whether a populist rhetorical shift is
actually occurring within the Front National, they contain several limitations. First, the
creation of my dictionary was limited to a select sample size. In order to refine my
results, I would need to increase the sample size used to create my dictionary. This
would allow me to list out more possible n-grams. Moreover, my categorization of the ngrams under certain rhetorical categories was based on a limited literature review.
Further study of the literature on populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric would
enable me to narrow what falls under each category. In particular, I would be able to
better distinguish between anti-pluralist and exclusionary rhetoric as well as anti-elite and
right-wing populist economic rhetoric.
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Nevertheless, the results of my findings should not be discounted. Of particular
note is my addition of MLP’s 2016-2017 campaign speeches. No other scholar had
included her most recent rhetoric in their analyses. Moreover, no other scholar had
specifically sought to measure the populist rhetoric between JMLP and MLP. As a result,
my findings provide unique insight into the debate as to whether the FN is actually
increasing in populist rhetoric.
In relation to the definition of populism, my findings lend insight into the broader
discussion as to whether populism is an ideology, a strategy, or a discursive style. In
particular, the results that MLP initially increased the Front National’s anti-elite rhetoric
in her 2011-2012 campaign, but then shifted her emphasis toward anti-pluralist
exclusionary sentiments in her 2016-2017 campaign. This possibly represents a strategic
shift in message to reflect the current issues of the time, rather than representing a
foundational change in ideology. While my research did not delineate out the verbal
structures of JMLP’s and MLP’s speeches and my sample size was limited to two
speakers, the two did share common discursive styles – namely, the criticism of enemies,
the use of black and white options, and emotional appeals. While the exact enemies,
options, and appeals varied between them, the overall message did not seem to change.
Consequently, it could be argued that the core ideology of the Front National is populist
in nature.
In terms of xenophobic rhetoric, my analysis results create further questions
regarding the line between anti-pluralism, exclusionary populism, and xenophobia. In
particular, whereas the Front National was once seen as a xenophobic party, under
MLP’s leadership this view has been somewhat mitigated. However, MLP actually
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increased the party’s exclusionary rhetoric in her most recent campaign. As a result, the
perception of certain rhetoric as xenophobic or not may have more to do with current
contextual factors and political correctness than a well-refined definition. For the FN in
particular this implies that its dédiabolisation efforts symbolized a shift towards
addressing contemporary issues with more appealing rhetoric.
As for the Front National, overall, my thesis suggests that the party’s current
image and message under MLP plays to exogenous factors and the fears of voters.
Indeed, the recent electoral success of FN candidates is linked to the saliency of pertinent
issues and the party’s rhetorical adjustment to correspond with them. Overall, the party
continues to strive to shed its past image under JMLP. Indeed, after reiteration of
controversial statements, MLP had JMLP expelled from the party.51 Following the
MLP’s unsuccessful presidential bid in the 2017 election, the FN renamed itself to the
Rassemblement National. Meanwhile, another key leader from the party – Florian
Philipot – broke away to create a more conservative party, Les Patriotes. In the end, it
remains to be seen as to whether these changes will signal further acceptance of the party
by mainstream politics and continued electoral success.
In conclusion, my research contributes to the ongoing dialogue surrounding the
rise of populist rhetoric and, in particular, its use with the Front National of
France. While my findings contribute to the groundwork of establishing a dictionary for
populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric, my results are limited to the FN. However,
my methods can serve as a model for further analysis of the National Front as well as
other parties considered to use populist rhetoric. Indeed, my research raises several

“French National Front expels founder Jean-Marie Le Pen”. BBC News. 20 August 2015.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34009901
51
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questions worth examining. Of note: 1) the connection between the perceived used of
populist rhetoric and labeling a party as populist; 2) the foundational categorization of
populism as an ideology, strategy, or discursive style; 3) the use of populist rhetoric by a
political party and its perceived mainstreaming; 4) the role of the media in the saliency of
populism and populist parties; and 5) the use of populist rhetoric by a political party
contributing to voter appeal and electoral success.
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Table 3: Comparison of Rhetoric Used by JMLP, by MLP, and by JMLP and MLP
JMLP
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Xenophobia
Anti-Semitism
Traditionalism
Naturalism – need for
space, humans to
follow the laws of
nature
Appeal to Christian
morality
Anti-homosexuality
Abrogation of civil
unions
Anti-communism
Law & order
a) Return of the
death penalty
Reference to WWII
and French colonial
wars
Reference to
fatherland

BOTH JMLP & MLP
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Capitalize on crises
Renounce ideology claim to be neither right
nor left.
List of enemies
Nationalism
Anti-immigration
Focus on insecurity
Decry decline in French
nationality/identity
Push for national
preference.
Merit-based
naturalization

MLP
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Offering of black and
white choices
Frequent scapegoating
Reference to personal
life
Use of vulgarity and
opposition language.
Clear, short, and simple
messages
Call for direct
democracy via
referendum
Appeal to common sense
of electorate
Appeal to sense of
exploitation by the
establishment
Toning down of
controversial statements,
namely with:
a) Racial mixing
b) Anti-communism
c) Anti-Americanism
d) Christian morality
e) Anti-Semitism
f) Anti-immigrant
g) Exclusionism
h) Death penalty
Increased reference to
laïcité - or secularism
Increased reference to
democracy
Claim to be the defender
of the traditional values
of the French Republic
Call to restore national
sovereignty
Attacks on
multiculturalism and
Islam with the argument
that they are
incompatible with
Republican values
Call for controlled
immigration
Acceptance of abortion,
homosexuality, and civil
unions
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•

Increased economic
discourse:
a) Economy service
for the people
b) Opposition to EU,
European Central
Bank, and euro
c) Attack capitalism
without frontiers
d) Anti-globalization
e) Call for financial
regulation
f) Pro small business

Table 4: List of Programmes Présidentiels
Candidate

Year

Month

Platform Name

Transcription/Video Source

JMLP

2002

April

Programme de M. JeanMarie Le Pen

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023001406.html

JMLP

2007

March

Programme électoral de
Jean-Marie Le Pen

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001250.html

MLP

2012

January

Programme de Mme Marine
Le Pen

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/123000632.html

MLP

2017

April

144 Engagements
Présidentiels

https://rassemblementnational.fr/pdf/144engagements.pdf.

Table 5: List of JMLP Campaign Speeches 2001-2002
Number

Year

Day

Location

Speech Name

Transcription/Video Source

1

2001

1 May

Paris

La Bataille de
France

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/013002510.html

2

2001

18 August

La Trinitésur-mer

Discours de La
Trinité sur mer
meeting

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/013003201.html

3

2001

23
September

Paris

Discours de Paris
BBR, Une minute
de silence

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/013003201.html

4

2001

1
December

Paris

Discours de Paris
colloque

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023000368.html
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5

2002

19
January

Brest

Discours de Brest
Meeting

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023000868.html

6

2002

20
January

Nantes

Discours de Nantes
Meeting

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023000881.html

7

2002

26
January

Tours

Discours de Tours

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023000909.html

8

2002

27
January

Paris

Discours de Paris
colloque

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023000912.html

N/A

2002

12
February

Bordeaux

Discours de
Bordeaux Meeting

Unable to find video or transcript.

9

2002

17
February

Lyon

Discours de Lyon
convention Le Pen

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023001278.html

10

2002

21
February

Paris

Discours de Paris
colloque

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023001283.html

11

2002

3 March

Lille

Discours de Lille
meeting

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023001291.html

12

2002

1 May

Paris

Discours de Paris

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023001628.html

13

2002

2 May

Marseille

Discours de
Marseille Meeting

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/023001684.html

Table 6: List of JMLP Campaign Speeches 2006-2007
Number

Year

Day

Location

Speech Name

Transcription/Video Source

1

2006

1 May

Paris

Discours du 1er
Mai

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063001580.html

2

2006

20 May

Paris

Discours de Paris
An

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063001831.html

3

2006

17 June

Paris

Discours de Paris

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063002330.html

4

2006

20
September

Valmy

Discours de Valmy

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063003354.html

5

2006

8 October

Palavasles-Flots

Discours de
Palavas-les-Flots

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063003622.html

6

2006

22
October

Vendée

Discours aux
Herbiers

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063003740.html
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7

2006

29
October

ParcayMeslay

Discours de
Parcay-Meslay

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063003859.html

8

2006

5
November

Bordeaux

Discours de
Bordeaux

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063003929.html

9

2006

12
November

Le
Bourget

Discours du
Bourget

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063004015.html

10

2006

19
November

Metz

Discours de Metz

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063004114.html

11

2006

26
November

Dijon

Discours de Dijon

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/063004223.html

N/A

2007

4 January

N/A

Voeux (Greetings)

Unable to find video or transcript.

12

2007

21
January

Paris

Discours de la
Plaine-Saint-Denis,
Meeting à Paris

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073000254.html

13

2007

27
January

Yvetot

Discours de Yvetot

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073000352.html

14

2007

11
February

Nantes

Discours de Nantes

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073000566.html

15

2007

20
February

Paris

Discours au forum
Chasse et Ruralité

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073000679.html

16

2007

25
February

Lille

Convention
présidentielle de
Lille

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073000758.html

17

2007

3 March

Marseille

Discours de
Marseille

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001305.html

18

2007

6 March

Paris

Discours au Salon
de l’agriculture

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001306.html

19

2007

11 March

Lyon

Discours de Lyon

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073000944.html

20

2007

21 March

Paris

Allocution devant
la CGPME

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001150.html

21

2007

23 March

Paris

Discours de Paris

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001151.html

22

2007

24 March

Nimes

Discours devant
l’USDIFRA de
Nimes

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001181.html

23

2007

25 March

Toulouse

Discours de
Toulouse

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001152.html
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24

2007

31 March

Paris

Discours de Paris

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001280.html

25

2007

6 April

Argenteuil

Discours de
Argenteuil

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001384.html

26

2007

15 April

Paris

Discours de Paris

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001490.html

27

2007

19 April

Nice

Discours de Nice

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/073001547.html

N/A

2007

22 April

N/A

Discours au soir du
premier tour

Unable to find video or transcript.

Table 7: List of MLP Campaign Speeches 2011-2012
Number

Year

Day

Location

Speech Name

Transcription/Video Source

1

2011

1 May

Paris

Discours du 1er mai

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Cu9MmDyEWiY

2

2011

11
September

Nice

Discours de Nice

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=30QXFayYaKk

3

2011

19
November

Paris

Présentation du
Projet
Présidentiel/Progra
mme présidentiel

https://www.dailymotion.com/vid
eo/xmfz5u

4

2011

30
November

Pontoise

Discours auprès des
forains

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=8ApMG8iYWQY

N/A

2011

8
December

Paris

Discours devant le
Sénat contre le droit
de vote des
étrangers

Unable to find video or transcript.

5

2011

11
December

Metz

Discours de clôture

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=EmqN5LMUCXE

6

2012

6 January

SaintDenis

Galette des rois

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VNu1GKbF6DU

7

2012

15 January

Rouen

Discours de Rouen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=6UhrNEjWMb4

8

2012

22 January

Bordeaux

Discours de Palais
des congrès de
Bordeaux

http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/grand-meeting-de-marine-lepen-a-bordeaux-le-22-janvier/
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9

2012

30 January

Perpignan

Grand Meeting
Présidentiel à
Perpignan

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=O1Dwe-pCXxs

10

2012

5 February

Toulouse

Meeting à Toulouse

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Co2wg9PgWtU

N/A

2012

12
February

Paris

Discours de Paris

Unable to find video or transcript.

11

2012

12
February

Strasbourg

Grand meeting de
Marine Le Pen à
Strasbourg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=FaJmzq_OA5g

12

2012

19
February

Lille

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Lille

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=uZLJDNXh1sg

13

2012

26
February

Val-deLoire

Discours de
Châteauroux

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=s2tFg-I3r9M

14

2012

4 March

Marseille

15

2012

13 March

HeninBeaumont

Déclaration de
candidature

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=0TGA6cyx-dY

16

2012

16 March

PalavasLes-Flots

Discours de Marine
Le Pen à PalavasLes-Flots

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=1hxkZ86NgL0

17

2012

17 March

Ajaccio

Discours de Marine
Le Pen en Corse à
Ajaccio

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=HwjsJSO2UyY

18

2012

25 March

Nantes

Déplacement à
Nantes

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/123000721.ht
ml

19

2012

29 March

Montpellier

Congrès de la
FNSEA à
Montpellier

http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/123000722.ht
ml

20

2012

20 March

Nice

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Nice

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=loatjnSZtCk

21

2012

7 April

Lyon

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Lyon

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wyHKdGjq8YE

N/A

2012

11 April

Brachay

Discours de Marine
Le Pen à Brachay :

Unable to find video or transcript.

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Marseille

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=4PqW4ykP2Bk
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« Les campagnes
d’abord ! »

22

2012

17 April

Paris

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen au Zénith
Paris

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=LPjB4vcsq3Y

23

2012

20 April

Merdrignac

Discours de
Merdrignac
(Bretagne)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Q7zNPC9K3VM

Table 8: List of MLP Campaign Speeches 2016-2017
Number

Year

Day

Location

Speech Name

Transcription/Video Source

1

2016

2 May

Paris

Discours de Marine
Le Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=O617QgkAVi4

2

2016

21 June

Vienne

Printemps
patriotique à
Vienne: discours de
Marine Le Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=tuxZpPwpc3Q

N/A

2016

10
September

Reims

Discours de Marine
Le Pen aux Assises
du Produire en
France

Unable to find video or transcript.

Coding
Scheme

2016

18
September

Fréjus

Discours de Marine
Le Pen aux Estivales
de Fréjus

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=WgAng1wIBtU

5

2016

23
September

Paris

Discours de Marine
Le Pen à la
convention
présidentielle sur
l'Ecole

http://www.voxfnredekker.com/ar
chives/2016/09/22/34354981.html

6

2016

11
October

Cournond’Auvergne

Convention sur la
protection animale :
discours de Marine
Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=843&v=_Y3ctmSd
Wwk

Video
Message Excluded

2016

20
October

N/A

Je soutiens la
police!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=J0Pj1nYpaE0

7

2016

21
October

Paris

Lancement du
Collectif Seniors :
discours de Marine
Le Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=XS2sWEhNdrE

8

2016

9
November

Paris

Discours de Marine
Le Pen : « La

http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/discours-de-marine-le-pen-la-
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France, Civilisation
mondiale au XXIème
siècle »

france-civilisation-mondiale-auxxieme-siecle/

Press
Conference
- Excluded

2016

9
November

N/A

Réaction de Marine
Le Pen aux résultats
des élections
américaines

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VdhZ4TmV5Pc

10

2016

5
December

Paris

Écologie et énergie
de demain : discours
de Marine Le Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=enMJbVPmK-A

11

2016

9
December

Paris

« Santé : protégeons
les Français ! » :
discours de Marine
Le Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=BkGJJJq2pis

Press
Conference
- Excluded

2017

4 January

N/A

Marine Le Pen
présente ses voeux à
la presse

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=vHebt7wb5u4

12

2017

6 January

Paris

« France, pays
d'entrepreneurs,
pays d'innovation » :
discours de Marine
Le Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Ry9ao3wAbMI

European
Parliament
- Excluded

2017

23 January

Coblence

Discours de Marine
Le Pen au Congrès
ENL de Coblence

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VUpx0MtHYT4

14

2017

5 February

Lyon

Assises
présidentielles de
Lyon : Discours de
Marine Le Pen

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ZHPOW91K-fM

15

2017

20
February

Clairvauxles-lacs

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à
Clairvaux-les-Lacs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=2439&v=U5eDMK
rUWT8

16

2017

24
February

Paris

Conférence
présidentielle n°2 : «
La politique
internationale de la
France »

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=p2qm0nybjIY

17

2017

25
February

Pierrelatte

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à
Pierrelatte

https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=2742&v=sfnFMbw
bGeE

18

2017

27
February

Nantes

Discours de Marine
Le Pen à Nantes

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=CdtFEu5NB6U
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19

2017

3 March

Paris

Conférence
présidentielle : « Le
rôle de l'Etat dans
l'économie »

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=BoFYTCQz214

20

2017

11 March

Châteauroux

Discours de Marine
Le Pen à
Châteauroux

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=TXIM5njpOSs

21

2017

11 March

Mirande

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à
Mirande

https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=2389&v=CQi8Vw
wXQ0w

22

2017

16 March

SaintRaphael

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à
Saint-Raphaël

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=046tWgJBZGc

Outside
France Excluded

2017

23 March

N’Djamena
(Chad)

Discours de Marine
Le Pen à N'Djaména

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=NVCWFA92OwE

23

2017

27 March

Lille

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Lille

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Ffg7--qnEyE

24

2017

27 March

Sables
d’Olonne

Discours de Marine
Le Pen aux Sables
d'Olonne

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wV65ZP66gbE

Q&A
Panel Excluded

2017

28 March

N/A

Marine Le Pen
invitée de la
matinale «
Présidentielle 2017
» organisée par le
MEDEF

http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/marine-le-pen-invitee-de-lamatinale-presidentielle-2017organisee-par-le-medef/

25

2017

31 March

TrinitePorhoet

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à La
Trinité-Porhoët

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=yclqBOG_u2A

26

2017

2 April

Bordeaux

Discours de Marine
Le Pen au meeting à
Bordeaux

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=LFsPBrprB1E

27

2017

4 April

BazocheGouet

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à La
Bazoche-Gouet

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=LOARVmbZhuw

28

2017

6 April

Monswiller

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à
Monswiller en
Alsace

https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=3313&v=nEFh_tM
58YA

29

2017

9 April

Ajaccio

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Ajaccio

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=4Vv1_Kth9-s
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30

2017

11 April

Paris

Conférence
présidentielle n°5 : «
La France face au
défi terroriste »

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=uoFfFCsZ4WE

31

2017

11 April

Arcis-surAube

Réunion publique de
Marine Le Pen à
Arcis-sur-Aube

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=kCUU_E4vk6I

32

2017

15 April

Perpignan

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Perpignan

https://www.youtube.com/watch?t
ime_continue=4674&v=kJLo8zGMIk

33

2017

17 April

Paris

Grand meeting de
Marine Le Pen au
Zénith de Paris

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=6cwimaYTt68

34

2017

19 April

Marseille

Discours de Marine
Le Pen à Marseille

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=rcWk4S-82rI

35

2017

23 April

HeninBeaumont

Allocution de
Marine Le Pen au
soir du premier tour
de l'élection
présidentielle

http://www.frontnational.com/vid
eos/allocution-de-marine-le-penau-soir-du-premier-tour-delelection-presidentielle/

36

2017

28 April

Nice

Meeting de Marine
Le Pen à Nice

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=MA6V2_t6wbY

37

2017

1 May

Villepinte

Grande réunion
publique de Marine
Le Pen à Villepinte

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=jHlrg4sX0xo

Table 9: Populist Rhetoric Dictionary
Anti-elite

Anti-pluralist

Appeal to people

Disdain for the power held by the
political class and administrative
bureaucracy.

Belief that “the people” are
homogeneous and that their
culture needs to be protected.

Idea that ordinary citizens house
inherent “common sense” which
lends them authority.

1) Administrat*
• Administation
2) Adversaire politique
• Political adversary
3) Américain
• American
4) Argent privé
• Private money
5) Autorités
supranationales
• Supranational
authorities

1) Assimil*
• Assimilation
2) Citoyenneté française
• French citizenship
3) Civilisation française
• French civilization
4) Cohésion sociale
• Social cohesion
5) Collectivité
• Collectivity
6) Communauté nationale
• National community

1) Âme des peuples
• Soul of the people
2) Colère du peuple
• Anger of the people
3) Le peuple français
• The French people
4) Légitime colère
• Justified anger
5) Peuple de France
• People of France
6) Populis*
• Populism
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6) Banq-; banc• Bank
7) Banque Centrale
Européenne
• Central European Bank
8) Banque Mondiale
• World Bank
9) Banques d’affaires
• Business banks
10) Baron
• Baron
11) Bobo
• Upper middle class
12) Bourgeois
• Upper middle class
13) Bruxelles
• Brussels
14) Bureaucra*
• Bureaucrat
15) Centralise*
• To centralize
16) Classe politique
• Political class
17) Classe populaire
• The underclass
18) Clientélisme
• Cronyism
19) Commission européenne
• European Commission
20) Conseil européen
• European Council
21) Convention européenne
• European Convention
22) Corruption
• Corruption
23) Décentralis*
• To decentralize
24) Détrui*
• To destroy
25) Élites
• Elite
26) Ennemi
• Ennemy
27) Étatisme
• Statism
28) Euro-atlantique
• Euro-Atlantic
29) Financ*
• Finance
30) FMI
• International Monetary
Fund
31) Groupes de pressions

7) Communautarisme
• Communitarianism
8) Cultur*
• Culture
9) Défend*
• To defend
10) Démocrat*
• Democracy
11) Désintégration sociale
• Social disintegration
12) Diversité
• Diversity
13) Double nationalité
• Dual nationality
14) Droit de la nationalité
• Nationality law
15) Égalité
• Equality
16) Équilibre
démographique
• Demographic balance
17) État de droit
• Rule of law; State of
order
18) Etre français
• To be French
19) Familles françaises
• French families
20) Femme*
• Women
21) Féodalités locales
• Local feudalities
22) Fracture sociale
• Social fracture
23) Française d’origine
étrangère
• French of foreign
origin
24) France rurale
• Rural France
25) Fraternité
• Brotherhood
26) Ghett*
• Ghetto
27) Heritage
• Heritage
28) Identité
• Identity
29) Individualisme
• Individualism
30) Injustice sociale
• Social injustice
31) Intégration

7) Pouvoir aux citoyen
• Power of the citizen
8) Référend*
• Referendum
9) Responsabilité
• Responsibility
10) Sens moral
• Moral sense
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• Pressure groups
32) Hollande (François)
33) Libéral-social
• Liberal-social
34) Libero-gaulliste
• Liberal-Gaullist
35) Lobbies
• Lobbyists
36) Média
• Media
37) Multination*
• Multination
38) Monopol*
• Monopoloy
39) Oligarchie politicoéconomique
• Political-economic
oligarchy
40) OMC
• World Trade
Organization
41) ONU
• United Nations
42) OTAN
• North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
43) PAC
• Civil solidarity pact
44) Parlement européen
• European Parliament
45) Propagande
• Propaganda
46) PS
• Socialist Party
47) Puissances d’argent
• Money powers
48) Renégoci*
• To renegotiate
49) RGPP
• French General Review
of Public Policies
50) Royaume-Uni
• United Kingdom
51) Sarkozy (Nicolas)
52) Schengen
• Schengen Treaty
53) Socialis*
• Socialist
54) Syndica*
• Union
55) Technocrat*
• Technocrat
56) Théoriciens

• Integration
32) Jeanne d’Arc
• Joan of Arc
33) Justice
• Justice
34) Laïcité
• Secularism
35) La Nation
• The Nation
36) Langue française
• French language
37) Loi française
• French law
38) Multicult*
• Multicultural
39) Natalité française
• French birthrate
40) National*
• National
41) Nationalité
• Nationality
42) Naturalis*
• To naturalize
43) Née
• Born
44) Nos campagnes
• Our land
45) Normes
• Norms
46) Notre langue
• Our language
47) Pacte Républicain
• Republican Pact
48) Patriot*
• Patriot
49) Patrimoine naturel
• Natural heritage
50) Perte
• Loss
51) Pléthor*
• Plethoric
52) Propre pays
• Our country
53) Protection social
• Social protection
54) Proteg*
• To protect
55) Républicaine*
• Republican
56) République française
• French Republic
57) Séparation des églises
et de l’État
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• Theorists
57) Théorie du complot
• Conspiracy theory
58) Traités européens
• European treaties
59) Ultra-libér*
• Ultra-liberal
60) UE/Unions Européens
• European Union
61) UMP
• Union for a Popular
Movement

58)
59)
60)
61)
62)
63)
64)
65)

• Separation of Church
and State
Société française
• French society
Solidarité nationale
• National solidarity
Souverain*
• Sovereign
Structures morales
• Moral structures
Terre de France
• Land of France
Territoire
• Territory
Valeurs
• Values
Zones de non-droit
• Areas of lawlessness

Table 10: Xenophobic Rhetoric Dictionary
Note: All exclusionary populist rhetoric is a sub-category of anti-pluralist rhetoric. All xenophobic
rhetoric is a sub-category of exclusionary populist rhetoric.

Exclusionary Populism

Overt Xenophobia

Aims to restrict certain groups from 1) receiving state
benefits, 2) engaging in the democratic process, and
3) being considered part of “the people”.

Negative reference to other ethnic identities, at
times inciting fear, hatred, and hostility, with a
belief that people have an inherent right to live
separately from these other ethnicities.

1) Apaisé
• Appeased
2) Barrière
• Barrier
3) Carte de séjour
• Residence card
4) Clandestin
• Clandestin
5) Combatt*
• To fight
6) Contrôl*
• To control
7) Criminel
• Criminal
8) Délinquant
• Offender
9) Discrimination positive
• Affirmative action
10) Étrang*
• Foreign
11) Explus*
• To expel

1) Africain*
• African
2) Agression
• Aggression
3) Antillais
• Person from the West Indies
4) Arabe*
• Arab
5) Asiatique
• Asian
6) Attentat*
• Bombing
7) Attaques organisées
• Organized attacks
8) Barbar*
• Barbarian
9) Beur*
• Child of a North African immigrant
10) Danger
• Danger
11) Differentialisme
• Differentialism

82
12) Flots d’immigrant
• Immigrant waves
13) Flux migratoires
• Migratory wave
14) Frontière
• Border
15) Illégal
• Illegal
16) Immigré*
• Immigrant
17) Immigration
• Immigration
18) Incontrôlé
• Uncontrolled
19) Indignité
• Indignity
20) Interdi*
• To prohibit
21) Lutt*
• To Fight
22) Massive
• Mssive
23) Migrant*
• Migrant
24) Multi recidivist*
• Multi-recividist
25) Pacifier
• To pacify
26) Population étrangère
• Foreign Population
27) Préférence
• Preference
28) Priorité
• Priority
29) Récidivist*
• Recidivist
30) Regroupement familial
• Family reunification
31) Ressortissants étrangers
• Foreign nationals
32) Sécurité
• Security
33) Séjour illégal
• Illegal stay
34) Séquestriations
• Sequestration
35) Tolérance zero
• Zero tolerance

12) Droit à la difference
• Right to difference
13) Extremist*
• Extremist
14) Fondamental*
• Fundamentalist
15) Gitan*
• Gypsy
16) Homosexuel*
• Homosexual
17) Indo-pakistanais*
• Person from south Asia
18) Insécurité
• Insecurity
19) Invasion
• Invasion
20) Islam*
• Islam
21) Juif*
• Jew
22) Maghreb
• North Africa
23) Mosqué*
• Mosque
24) Musulman*
• Muslim
25) Pied Noir*
• Person of French origin born in
Algeria
26) Pillage
• Looting
27) Saccage
• Pillage
28) Salafist*
• Salafist
29) Soumission
• Submission
30) Terror*
• Terror
31) Violence
• Violence
32) Viols*
• Rape
33) Ultraviolent*
• Ultraviolent
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Table 11: Economic Rhetoric Dictionary
General Economy

Right-wing Populist

Statements about the wealth and resources of a
country, in particular production, consumption, and
services.

Advocates anti-globalization, protection of
national businesses and native employment, and
regulation of the elite.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Agence de notation
• Rating Agency
Aide au logement
• Housing assistance
Aide sociale
• Social assistance
Argent public
• Public money
Assurance maladie
• Health insurance
Augmentation de salaire
• Salary increase
Austérité
• Austerity
Balance commerciale
• Trade balance
Budget
• Budget
CETA
• Canada-European Union
Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement
Chiffr*
• Numbers
Chôm*
• Unemployment
CMU (couverture maladie universelle)
• Universal health coverage
Commerce
• Trade
Concurrence
• Competition
Consommation
• Consumption
Contribution sociale
• Social contribution
Cotisations
• Contribution
Coûts de gestion
• Administrative costs
Coût de logement
• Housing costs
Crise financière
• Financial crisis
Croissance

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Agric*
• Agriculture
AME (Aide médicale d'État)
• State medical aid
Artisans
• Artisans
Banq-; banc• Bank
Barrières douanières
• Custom barriers
CECA
• European Coal and Steel
Community
Chômage de masse
• Mass unemployment
Contrat de stabilization
• Stabilization contract
Délocalisation
• Relocation
Dumping social
• Social dumping
Élite*
• Elite
Évasion fiscale
• Fiscal evasion
Financ*
• Finance
Global*
• Global
Grand* distribut*
• Mass distribution
Liberalis*
• To liberalize
Main d’oeuvre
• Manual labor
MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de
France)
• Movement of the Enterprises of
France
Métier manuel
• Manual occupation
Mondialisme
• Globalism
Mondiale sauvage
• Uncontrolled globalism
Mondialisation
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• Growth
23. CSG (contribution sociale généralisée)
• General social contribution
24. Dépenses
• Expenses
25. Dette
• Debt
26. Développ*
• To develop
27. Disparité
• Disparity
28. Droit de douane
• Customs duty
29. Économ*
• Economy
30. Emploi
• Work
31. Endettement
• Debt
32. Entrepr*
• Business; entrepreneur
33. Euro
• Euro
34. Export*
• Export
35. Fisc*
• Fiscal
36. Gaspill*
• To waste
37. Grande distribution
38. Impôt
• Tax
39. Industrie
• Industry
40. Investissement
• Investment
41. Laboureur
• Worker
42. Marché
• Market
43. Modernis*
• To modernize
44. Monnaie
• Currency
45. Ouvrier
• Worker
46. Patronat
• Employer
47. Pauvreté
• Poverty
48. PIB
• GDP
49. Pouvoir d’achat

• Globalization
23. Moyennes entrepr*
• Medium-sized business
24. OMC (Organisation Mondiale du
Commerce)
• World Trade Organiation
25. PAC (Politique Agricole Commune)
• Common Agricultural Policy
26. Patriotisme économique
• Economic patriotism
27. Petites entrepr*
• Small business
28. Plan de renflouement
• Bailout plan
29. PME (Petites et Moyennes Entreprises)
• Small and Medium Businesses
30. PMI
• European Manufacturing
Purchasing Managers Index
31. Quota d’importation
• Import quota
32. Ravage
• Ravage
33. Reconqu*
• To reclaim
34. Réindustrialisation
• Reindustrialization
35. Rétabl*
• To reestablish
36. Souveraineté monétaire
• Monetary sovereignty
37. Libre-échange*
• Free trade
38. Travail manuel
• Manual work
39. Travail précaire
• Precarious work
40. Zone euro
• Euro zone
41. Zone rurale
• Rural areas
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• Purchasing power
50. Privatis*
• To privatize
51. Prospérité
• Prosperity
52. Protection sociale
• Social protection
53. Réform*
• To reform
54. Règle
• Rule
55. Régulation
• Regulation
56. Retraite
• Retirement
57. RMI (revenu minimum d’insertion)
• Social welfare income
58. RSI (régime social des indépendants)
• Self-employed social security
59. Salaire
• Salary
60. Sécurité sociale
• Security social
61. Services publics
• Public services
62. Sous-payés
• Under-payed
63. Stagnation
• Stagnation
64. Système de protection
• System of protection
65. TAFTA
• Free trade agreement between EU
and US
66. Tarif
• Tarif
67. Taux d'intérêt
• Interest rates
68. Travail*
• Work

Table 12: List of Top Frequently Used Words by JMLP from 2001-2002 Campaign
Speeches
Populist Rhetoric
Anti-Elite
1)
2)
3)
4)

Financ*
Socialis*
Bruxelles
Américain

Anti-Pluralist
1)
2)
3)
4)

National*
Nationalité
Souverain*
Valeur*

Appeal to
People
1) Responsabilité
2) Référend*

Exclusionary Populist
& Xenophobic
Rhetoric

Economic Rhetoric

Exclusionary
Populist

General
Economy

1)
2)
3)
4)

Étrang*
Sécurité
Immigré*
Interdi*

Xenophobic
1) Terror*
2) Fondamental*
3) Danger
4) Islam*

1)
2)
3)
4)

Econom*
Chôm*
Développ*
Retraite

RWP
Economic
1)
2)
3)
4)

Agric*
Rétabl*
Mondialilsation
Global
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5) Banq*; banc*
6) Corruption
7) Syndicat*
8) Bureaucra*
9) Client*
10) Multination*

5) Cultur*
6) Défend*
7) Démocrat*
8) Femme*
9) Justice
10) Patriot*

5) Préférence
6) Lutt*
7) Pacifi*
8) Combatt*
9) Immigration
10) Priorité

5) Musulman*
6) Insécurité
7) Attaque*
8) Attentat*
9) Violence
10) Africain*

5) Entrepr*
6) Fisc*
7) Croissance
8) Réform*
9) Concurrence
10) Chiffre*

5) Libéralis*
6) Reconqu*

Table 13: List of Top Frequently Used Words by JMLP from 2006-2007 Campaign
Speeches
Populist Rhetoric
AntiPluralist

Appeal to
People

1) National*
2) Valeur*
3) Justice
4) Souverain*
5) Défend*
6) Femme*
7) Patriot*
8) Nationalité
9) Protection
10) Cultur*
11) Démocrat*

1) Responsabilité
2) Référend*
3) Populis*

Anti-Elite
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)

Financ*
Sarkozy
Bruxelles
Syndica*
Socialis*
Administrat*
Banc*/banq*
Monopol*
Multination*
Américain
Ultra-libér*

Exclusionary Populist
& Xenophobic
Rhetoric

Economic Rhetoric

Exclusionary
Populist

General
Economy

Xenophobic

1) Étrang*
2) Sécurité
3) Immigré*
4) Lutt*
5) Préférence
6) Combatt*
7) Interdi*
8) Immigration
9) Criminel
10) Pacifi*

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

1) Econom*
2) Entrepr*
3) Chôm*
4) Retraite
5) Développ*
6) Fisc*
7) Réform*
8) Chiffr*
9) Dette
10) Dépenses

Fondamental*
Insécurité
Musulman*
Terror*
Violence
Danger
Arabe*
Agression*
Juif*
Beur*

RWP
Economic
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Agric*
Mondialilsation
Rétabl*
Global*
Artisans
Libéralis*
Délocalisation
Reconqu*

Table 14: List of Top Frequently Used Words by MLP from 2011-2012 Campaign
Speeches
Exclusionary
Populist &
Xenophobic Rhetoric

Populist Rhetoric
Anti-Elite
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)

Sarkozy
Financ*
Banc*/banq*
Hollande
Syndicat*
Elite
Socialis*
PS
Bruxelles
UMP
Administrat*

AntiPluralist
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

National
Défend*
Valeur*
Patriot*
Souverain*
Cultur*
Justice
Identité
Démocrat*
Protection

Appeal to
People
1) Responsabilité
2) Référend*
3) Populis*

Exclusionary
Populist
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Etrang*
Immigration
Sécurité
Lutt*
Interd*
Combatt*
Priorité
Immigré
Criminal
Délinquant

Xenophobic
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Insécurité
Islam*
Violence
Fondamental*
Musulman*
Agression*
Terror*
Attaque
Récidivist*
Mosquée*

Economic Rhetoric
General
Economy
1) Econom*
2) Entrepris*
3) Chôm*
4) Euro
5) Concurrence
6) Dette
7) Monnaie
8) Fiscal*
9) Règle
10) Développ*

RWP Economic
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Agricol*
Mondialisation
Rétabl*
Artisans
Liberalis*
OMC
Reindustrialisation
Délocalisation
Global
Reconqu*

Table 15: List of Top Frequently Used Words by MLP from 2016-2017 Campaign
Speeches
Populist Rhetoric
Anti-Elite
1)

Financ*

Anti-Pluralist
1) National*

Appeal to
People
1) Responsabilité

Exclusionary
Populist &
Xenophobic Rhetoric
Exclusionary
Populist
1)

Sécurité

Economic Rhetoric
General
Economy

Xenophobic
1) Islam*

1)

Econom*

RWP Economic
1) Agric*
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2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Banc*/banq*
Administrat*
Hollande
Bruxelles
Multination*
Client*
Sarkozy
Ps
Socialis*

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Patriot*
Cultur*
Démocrat*
Défend*
Souverain*
Protection
Identité
Communaut
arisme
10) Justice

2) Référend*

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Immigration
Etrang*
Lutt*
Interd*
Migrant*
Priorité
Apaisée
Combatt*
Frontière

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Terror*
Fondamental*
Insécurité
Attaque*
Musulman*
Attentat*
Mosqué*
Violence

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Entrepr*
Chôm*
Developp*
Emploi
Fiscal*
Euro
Concurrence
Impôt
Dette

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Mondialisation
Retabl*
Global*
Reconqu*
Artisans
Liberalis*
Réindustrialisation
Délocalisation

Table 16: Analysis Raw Numbers
Campaign
Number &
Percentage
Populist
Rhetoric
Xenophobic
Rhetoric
Economic
Rhetoric

Campaign
Number &
Percentage
Anti-Elite
Anti-Pluralist
Appeal to
People
Exclusionary
Populism
Overt
Xenophobia
General
Economy
Far RightWing Populist

JMLP 20012002

JMLP 20062007

MLP 20112012

MLP 20162017

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

704

42.37%

1443

44.95%

1714

52.41%

1991

40.36%

441

26.54%

591

18.41%

582

17.79%

1293

26.21%

516

31.05%

1176

36.63%

974

29.78%

1648

33.41%

JMLP 20012002

JMLP 20062007

MLP 20112012

MLP 20162017

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

197

11.86%

555

17.28%

813

24.86%

557

11.29%

481

28.95%

823

25.63%

862

26.36%

1352

27.41%

26

1.56%

65

2.02%

39

1.19%

82

1.66%

261

15.71%

444

13.81%

348

10.64%

699

14.17%

180

10.83%

147

4.57%

234

7.15%

594

12.04%

426

25.64%

931

29.00%

760

23.24%

1378

27.93%

90

5.41%

245

7.63%

214

6.54%

270

5.47%

